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THE DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA IN DEATH
QUALIFICATION OF CAPITAL JURORS
J. Thomas Sullivan*
It is important to recall what motivated Members of this Court
at the genesis of our modern capital punishment case law. Furman
v. Georgia was decided in an atmosphere suffused with concern
about race bias in the administration of the death penalty-
particularly in Southern States.1
INTRODUCTION
While the Supreme Court rejected the use of the death penalty
in cases involving aggravated rape of child victims in Kennedy v.
Louisiana2 in 2008, there was no suggestion in the Court's decision
that overall support for capital punishment within the Court and
the country had significantly diminished. 3 In fact, one of the rather
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansaas at Little Rock ("UALR")
Bowen School of Law. I want to acknowledge the excellent work and support
provided by Molly K. Sullivan, Assistant Federal Defender, Eastern District of
Arkansas, in reviewing this Article. This is third in a series of articles
examining the influence of racial or ethnic discrimination in distorting the
capital sentence process. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Lethal Discrimination, 26
HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 69 (2010), and Lethal Discrimination 2:
Repairing the Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 26
HARv. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 113 (2010). Generous support underwriting
the research and writing of this Article was provided by the UALR Bowen
School of Law.
1. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(referring to the social concerns underlying the Court's considerations in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972)).
2. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
3. In fact, the Court has consistently upheld the use of capital punishment
as a sentencing alternative since its decisions precluding the use of the penalty
in cases involving juveniles or individuals suffering from significant
developmental disabilities or mental retardation. See generally, e.g., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). For
instance, the Court upheld the use of lethal-injection protocols against an
Eighth Amendment challenge in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). And more
recently, it rejected a capital defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
challenge in Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 151 (2010), despite counsel's
strategy in closing argument in characterizing the mentally impaired defendant
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amazing aspects of the 2008 presidential election was that
Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama agreed with Justice
Alito's dissent,4 expressing his belief that capital punishment should
be authorized for certain rapists who have committed violent sexual
offenses against child victims. 5 The effect-regardless of intent-of
Obama's statement, supported by his prior writings, was to
neutralize any Republican attacks that would have cast him as soft
on crime, a lesson learned by Democrats in the failed 1988
candidacy of Michael Dukakis.6 Perhaps the most interesting and
undiscussed aspect of Obama's declared support for the application
of capital punishment to child rape is the fact that his view
contrasts so sharply with attitudes held by a majority of African
Americans.
In considering the broad question of whether the administration
of the death penalty is tainted, perhaps inherently so, by the
continuing existence of racially discriminatory attitudes in
American society, 7 a complete assessment requires that virtually all
aspects of the operation of the criminal law and criminal justice
system be reviewed. A comprehensive examination would almost
necessarily include inquiry about the root causes of violent crime,
as "sick," "twisted," and "demented" and reminding jurors of the defendant's
admiration for Hitler. Id. at 150. The Court held that even this questionable
line of argument did not support finding that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance where the record does not support the conclusion that a "more
reasonable" argument would have, within reasonable probability, led to a
different result. Id. at 151.
4. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Lyle Davidson, Final Brief on Kennedy v. Louisiana,
SCOTUSBLoG (Sept. 24, 2009, 2:12PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/final-
brief-on-kennedy-v-louisiana! (noting that the State of Louisiana appended
statements from Senators McCain and Obama opposing the majority's decision
in Kennedy in support of its motion for rehearing); McCain, Obama Disagree
with Child Rape Ruling, NBCNEWS.coM (June 26, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25379987/ns/politics.decision_08/t/mccain.obama-
disagree-child-rape-ruling ("'I have said repeatedly that I think that the death
penalty should be applied in very narrow circumstances for the most egregious
of crimes,' Obama said at a news conference. 'I think that the rape of a small
child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime and if a state makes a decision that
under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances the death penalty is at least
potentially applicable, that that does not violate our Constitution."').
6. McCain, Obama Disagree with Child Rape Ruling, supra note 5 ("In
1988, a question about rape and capital punishment tripped up Democratic
presidential nominee Michael Dukakis. Dukakis was asked during a nationally
televised debate with Republican George H. W. Bush whether he'd still oppose
the death penalty if his wife were raped and murdered. His unemotional,
dispassionate answer was ridiculed, and gave Republicans more material to
paint him as an emotionless liberal.").
7. This was the position taken by Justice Douglas in his opinion
supporting the plurality decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240, 247
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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persistent effects of lingering racism in social attitudes, disparate
impact of certain public policies on members of ethnic minority
groups, the roles of poverty and drug abuse within various
communities in influencing behavioral choices, and the responses of
law enforcement officials and prosecutors to violent crime-in this
context murders-that may qualify for treatment as capital offenses.
A thorough, overall assessment of capital punishment and its
administration as it impacts ethnic minorities and American society,
generally, is beyond the scope of any single discipline.8 Perhaps
more significantly, for the purposes of legal analysis, it is almost
certainly beyond the expertise and scope of authority vested in the
judicial system.9 If addressed at all, it would seem to be a matter of
8. Much of the most instructive work on issues relating to the impact of
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system has been done by social
scientists, rather than lawyers, although many law faculties now include
scholars trained in multidisciplinary analysis. For examples of significant
scholarship that goes beyond legal analysis to consider issues relating to this
topic, see Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells,
Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the
Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUDIES 277 (2001) (Professors Eisenberg and
Garvey are members of the Cornell University Law Faculty; Wells is a
Professor of Statistics in the Department of Social Statistics at Cornell); Nancy
J. King & Roosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: Comparing
Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 331 (2005) (using statistical analysis to demonstrate that in
selected comparative samples of sentences, juries tended to impose more varied
and severe sentences than those imposed by judges. King is a Professor of Law
at Vanderbilt University Law School; Noble is Senior Lecturer in the
Department of Sociology at Vanderbilt); Samuel Sommers, Determinants and
Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity: Empirical Findings, Implications, and
Directions for Future Research, 2 SOC. ISSUES & POL'Y REV. 65 (2008) (providing
also a valuable bibliography on pages 97-107); and Robert Weisberg, The Death
Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New
Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV. LAW & Soc. Sci. 151 (2005) (reviewing reliance of social-
science methodology in examining the unresolved issue of deterrent effect of
capital sentencing).
9. When confronted with a claim that the death penalty was imposed in a
racially discriminatory fashion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987),
the Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that the supporting social-
science evidence showing racially imbalanced use of the death penalty relied on
by the petitioner failed to demonstrate the "major systemic defects" that had led
a plurality of the Court to reject then-existing capital sentencing statutes in
Furman v. Georgia. 481 U.S. at 312-13. Thus, in light of the majority decision,
an individual capital defendant must demonstrate that the death sentence
imposed in his own case was the product of racial bias in order to obtain relief.
The majority's focus was made apparent in its directive: "If the circumstances of
a particular case indicate a significant likelihood that racial bias may influence
a jury, the Constitution requires questioning as to such bias." Id. at 309 n.30
(citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976)). Justice Powell, who wrote
the majority opinion in McCleskey, had taken a similarly limited view in his
dissenting opinion in Furman, observing:
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investigation that must be undertaken with serious commitment to
fact finding by the legislative branch. 10
This Article focuses on the disparity in support for the death
penalty among black and white Americans and the dilemma created
by this disparity in any meaningful effort to combat influences and
perceptions of racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty.11 The dilemma involves a problem created when lack
of support for the death penalty among African Americans
compromises the composition of capital juries in such a way that the
capital sentencing process threatens to become a system in which
minority jurors are excluded from this critical aspect of the criminal
justice process altogether.
I. DEATH SENTENCES AND THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF CAPITAL JURIES
One aspect of the criminal justice system particularly relevant
to the consideration of fairness of capital sentencing, which has been
especially troubling and resulted in significant litigation, involves
the composition of juries. While the problem has been addressed
generally with regard to criminal trial juries, it has often been
raised in the context of capital prosecutions. 12 Concerns about racial
fairness in the use of the death penalty have enhanced the relevance
Although not presented by any of the petitioners today, a different
argument, premised on the Equal Protection Clause, might well be
made. If a Negro defendant, for instance, could demonstrate that
members of his race were being singled out for more severe
punishment than others charged with the same offense, a
constitutional violation might be established.
408 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
10. In considering the impact of the social-science evidence offered in
support of the petitioner's challenge to the death penalty in McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 312-13, Professor Weisberg observed that the Supreme Court did not reject
the evidence as unpersuasive or insufficient, but instead, accepted the data as
accurate while denying relief on the equal protection claim by holding that the
research did not serve to show that his death sentence was the result of
intentional discrimination. Weisberg, supra note 8, at 164. Moreover, the
Court rejected the more generalized Eighth Amendment claim based on the
influence of racial discrimination in creating disparity in the application of the
death penalty, according to Weisberg, because the implications of the research
would effectively serve to condemn the entire criminal justice system since the
factors underlying discriminatory use of the death penalty "probably infected
the entire law enforcement system." Id. at 164-65.
11. A significant aspect of the potential damage created by the perception
of racial bias in the administration of the death penalty noted but not otherwise
addressed in this Article involves the fear of black capital defendants that they
will be sentenced to death because of racial discrimination in the selection of
capital juries. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 192 S.E. 852, 853 (N.C. 1937) (holding that the
argument that a defendant tried by an all-white, all-male jury was not
supported by the trial record).
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of underlying issues that implicate sentencing decisions that involve
the imposition of death sentences based on jury decision making.
13
The heart of the most serious attacks on jury composition lies in the
underrepresentation of African Americans in criminal trial juries,
particularly in the trial of capital cases in which the death penalty is
sought. 14 And the most troubling of these scenarios involves the
conviction and death sentencing imposed upon black defendants by
all-white juries. 15
The argument that the exclusion of African Americans from
criminal juries violates constitutional protections has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court.
16 In the celebrated case of the
"Scottsboro Boys,"'17 Norris v. Alabama,'
8 the Court reversed the
convictions of the black defendants convicted of rape by an all-white
jury based upon evidence unequivocally demonstrating the
systematic exclusion of African Americans from service on grand
and petty juries in the State over an extended period of years.'
9 The
Court found:
We are of the opinion that the evidence required a different
result from that reached in the state court. We think that the
evidence that for a generation or longer no negro had been
called for service on any jury in Jackson county, that there
were negroes qualified for jury service, that according to the
practice of the jury commission their names would normally
appear on the preliminary list of male citizens of the requisite
age but that no names of negroes were placed on the jury roll,
and the testimony with respect to the lack of appropriate
consideration of the qualifications of negroes, established the
discrimination which the Constitution forbids.
20
Thirty years after the Court's clear decision in Norris, in Swain




16. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879), the Court held
that the statutory exclusion of African Americans from jury service is
unconstitutional based upon violation of their rights as citizens.
17. The case has generated extensive commentary and coverage, including
the recent retelling of the story in an acclaimed Broadway Musical, The
Scottsboro Boys. See The Scottsboro Boys, SCOrSBOROMUSICAL.COM,
http://scottsboromusical.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2014). The
musical premiered off Broadway in 2010, then opened on Broadway in 2010,
and received twelve Tony Award nominations, but won none. See id.
18. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
19. Id. at 599.
20. Id. at 596.
21. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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and sentence of death for rape22 on the ground that the prosecution
had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by peremptorily
challenging all six qualified black jurors, resulting in an all-white
jury that decided his fate. 23 While recognizing the underlying merit
to his claim that exclusion of prospective jurors based on race would
violate constitutional protections, 24 the Swain majority nevertheless
held that the prosecutor's motivation for the use of peremptory
challenges in an individual case was insulated from inquiry,25 and
thus, constitutional attack.26 For twenty years, the burden imposed
upon criminal defendants to show that prosecutors engaged in a
pattern of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in order to
sustain a constitutional challenge based on exclusion of minority
jurors-the test imposed by the Swain majority-persisted until the
Supreme Court overruled its remedy provision by permitting
objections to the use of peremptory strikes in individual cases in
Batson v. Kentucky.27
Even a cursory review of state court decisions demonstrates
that the incidence of death sentences imposed on black defendants
by all-white juries has been widespread over the course of post-
Furman use of the death penalty.28 While some state courts have
22. Id. at 203.
23. Id. at 230-31.
24. Id. at 203-04.
25. Id. at 221-22.
26. The legacy of discrimination and underrepresentation of African
Americans in criminal trials in Alabama courts and those of other Southern
states is documented in BRIAN A. STEVENSON, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY (2010),
available at http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%2ORace%20and%2oJury%2OReport.pdf
(documenting the prevalence of death sentences imposed by all-white or nearly
all-white juries in capital trials).
27. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
28. In some cases, courts have ordered relief where defendants were
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by all-white juries. Typically,
claims related to the exclusion of minority jurors have been raised on behalf of
black defendants, often charged in cross-racial offenses in which victims were
white. The sampling of reported death sentences imposed by all-white juries
shows that whether or not this circumstance has been common, it has been
reflected in decisions from a significant number of states. See Alabama: Wright
v. State, 593 So. 2d 111, 118-19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Jackson v. State, 516
So. 2d 726, 758 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). Arkansas: Sales v. State, No. CR 10-53,
2011 WL 4492458, at *1 (Ark. Sept. 29, 2011); Wooten v. State, 931 S.W.2d 408,
410-11 (Ark. 1996) (white defendant); Ward v. State, 733 S.W.2d 728, 729-30
(Ark. 1987); California: Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 164 (2005); People
v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1112 (Cal. 2010); People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 690
(Cal. 1992); People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1081 (Cal. 1989); People v.
Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 103 (Cal. 1986); Delaware: Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997,
1009 (Del. 1985), relief granted, No. 03-11094, 1988 WL 130430, at *2-3 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 1988); Florida: State v. Davis, 872 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla.
2004); McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 502-03 (Fla. 1999); Gordon v. State,
1112 [Vol. 49
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704 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1997); Bottoson v. Singletary, 685 So. 2d 1302, 1303
(Fla. 1997); Capehart v. State, 583 So. 2d 1009, 1014 (Fla. 1991); Georgia:
Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 793 (Ga. 1987); Cervi v. State, 282 S.E.2d 629,
633 (Ga. 1981); Jackson v. Hopper, 207 S.E.2d 58, 60 (Ga. 1974); Illinois: People
v. Thomas, 647 N.E.2d 983, 988 (Ill. 1995); People v. Johnson, 499 N.E.2d 1355,
1368 (111. 1986) (all-white jury convicted, court sentenced black defendant to
death when defendant waived jury sentencing); People v. Jones, 475 N.E.2d
832, 836-37 (Ill. 1985); People v. Gaines, 473 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Ill. 1984); People
v. Lampkin, 457 N.E.2d 50, 55 (Ill. 1983); People v. Newsome, 443 N.E.2d 634,
637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Kentucky: Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111,
112 (Ky. 1994); Louisiana: State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 486 (La. 2006), rev'd
in part, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007), rev'd in part, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); State v. Weary,
931 So. 2d 297, 336 (La. 2006); State v. Hoffman, 768 So. 2d 542, 556-57 (La.
2000); State v. Wessinger, 736 So. 2d 162, 196 (La. 1999); State v. Taylor, 669
So. 2d 364, 381 (La. 1996); State v. Ford, 489 So. 2d 1250, 1263-64 (La. 1986);
State v. Perry, 420 So. 2d 139, 152 (La. 1982); Maryland: State v. Calhoun, 511
A.2d 461, 465 (Md. 1986); Mississippi: Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808 (Miss.
2013); Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322, 333 (Miss. 1999); Carr v. State, 655 So.
2d 824, 839 (Miss. 1995); Missouri: State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 542 (Mo.
2010); Ringo v. State, 120 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Mo. 2003); State v. Taylor, 18
S.W.3d 366, 374 (Mo. 2000); Nevada: Moore v. State, No. 55091, 2012 WL
3139870, at *4 (Nev. Aug. 1, 2012); Nevius v. State, 699 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Nev.
1985); New Jersey: State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1154 (N.J. 1996); North
Carolina: State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543, 553 (N.C. 1994); Ohio: State v.
Herring, 762 N.E.2d 940, 953 (Ohio 2002); State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 954
(Ohio 1998); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Crenshaw, 470 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa.
1983); Tennessee: State v. Johnson, 762 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tenn. 1988); Texas: Ex
Parte Williams, No. AP-76455, 2012 WL 2130951, at *20, *26 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 13, 2012); Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886, 929-30 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989); and Virginia: Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 821, 844-45 (Va.
1992). Conventional legal research does not necessarily disclose how pervasive
the experience of all-white juries in imposing death sentences may actually be.
Other instances of black defendants suffering capital sentences imposed by all-
white juries may simply not be reflected in published decisions, however. For
instance, in Sterling v. Dretke, 117 F. App'x 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth
Circuit rejected a federal habeas claim based on trial counsel's failure to voir
dire prospective jurors on racial prejudice where posttrial investigation
disclosed that one of the twelve white jurors admittedly referred to African
Americans as "nig**rs." Sterling had argued on direct appeal that the State
had used its peremptory challenges to remove black "venirepersons" in the jury
selection phase of his capital trial. Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992). Neither court referenced the all-white jury in its decision, a
fact known to the author as one of Sterling's post-conviction attorneys.
Similarly, not all death sentences imposed by all-white juries have been
suffered by minority defendants. For instance, in Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d
364, 369, 382 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit ordered federal habeas relief on a
Batson claim in a case that had been pending for thirty years based on improper
exclusion of black venirepersons by Dallas County, Texas, prosecutors. Reed is
white, but was entitled to the protection of Batson under Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) because the claim was based, in part, on the exclusion of jurors
based on their race or ethnic background under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reed, 555 F.3d at 368. Consequently, the accused's race or ethnicity may be an
important factor in considering the nature of potential racial animus on the
part of jurors considering sentencing a convicted defendant to death-
2014] 1113
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addressed the potential prejudice by affording relief, more typically,
reviewing courts have rejected claims that death sentences imposed
by all-white juries, even when the accused is black, represent too
great a threat of constitutional taint in upholding those sentences. 29
Not only does the imposition of an all-white jury's death
sentence or death recommendation threaten the integrity of the
punishment decisions in circumstances in which black defendants
suffer the sentence, but the potential for infliction of death due to
racial or ethnic prejudice may also compromise the integrity of other
dispositions. For instance, in Samuels v. State,30 the state court
rejected a post-conviction challenge to the defendant's guilty plea to
a murder charge alleged to have resulted from his fear of the death
penalty. 31 The court relayed the defendant's argument:
I only pled guilty because my lawyer, Peter Sterling, told me
that if I went to trial that I would probably get an all white
jury and that because I am black and accused of killing a white
man that the jury would probably find me guilty and give me
the death sentence, and that even though I had a very good
case that he thought that my best chance to avoid the death
penalty was to accept the offer to plead guilty to second degree
murder and that I did not have any chance to get the advise
[sic] of others and based on what my lawyer told me and what
I know about the way things work in this part of Missouri, I
was convinced that my only real choices were to plead guilty
for something I did not do or end up dying in the gas chamber
for something I did not do.
32
The court found that the defendant failed to carry his burden of
proof on his post-conviction attack, explaining:
particularly in cross-racial murders-but the constitutional violation still exists
if race is not an issue directly implicated in the offense. It remains a significant
factor in considering the attitudes of potential jurors to the use of the death
penalty, the focus of this Article. The Fifth Circuit never mentioned that Reed
was sentenced to death by an all-white jury, again a fact known to the author as
one of his post-conviction attorneys.
29. See cases cited supra note 28.
30. 770 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
31. Id. at 719.
32. Id.
1114 [Vol. 49
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The movant knew the anticipated evidence against him. He
knew Garner had been found guilty of first degree murder.
Movant's motivation to avoid the possibility of the death
penalty is not the type of fear that forms the basis for the
withdrawal of a guilty plea. "Fear that the death penalty
might be imposed does not render a guilty plea vulnerable to a
subsequent attack on the ground that the plea was coerced."
33
Even if the appellate court was correct in holding that fear of
the death penalty does not render a guilty plea involuntary, 34 the
prospect that a death sentence would be imposed as a result of racial
prejudice-thus prompting a guilty plea to avoid death-cannot be
disregarded in light of the history of capital sentencing in the
United States.
II. RACIAL FAIRNESS AND JURORS IN THE CAPITAL SENTENCING
PROCESS
The lengthy history of jury selection litigation in the Supreme
Court suggests the Court's significant concern that the jury trial
system in the nation's courts not be contaminated by racial
discrimination. 35 Another perspective from the Court demonstrates
its long-standing concern that citizens not be arbitrarily excluded
from jury service based on race, ethnicity,36 or gender. 37 That
concern has been reflected in a series of decisions addressing the
demographic composition of juries, particularly capital juries.
38
33. Id. at 722 (citing Hurd v. State, 735 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987)). One might argue that trial counsel improperly influenced his client to
plead guilty by advising him of the potential prejudice he might suffer if
sentenced by an all-white jury, perhaps scaring him into pleading guilty. But,
given the realities, how could counsel have represented his client properly
without explaining the potential consequences of exercising his right to jury
trial, including the threat of a death sentence if convicted?
34. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28, 38-39 (1970)
(rejecting the argument that a guilty plea to a murder charge entered to avoid
possibility of the death penalty at trial rendered the plea involuntary).
35. See supra note 28.
36. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879). The focus in
Strauder was on the statutory exclusion of African Americans from jury service,
a right and duty of citizenship. The right of the accused to be tried by an
ethnically diverse jury, the focus of this Article, reflects a different concern.
37. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975), the Court held that a statutory scheme or procedure effectively
excluding females from service violates the fair cross-section requirement for
juries under the Sixth Amendment. These rulings were not directed at the
right of women to serve as jurors, but the criminal defendant's right to have a
jury pool randomly drawn, reflecting the demographic makeup of the
community. A system of self-exclusion that prompted women to avoid jury
service undermined the Sixth Amendment's promise of a jury fairly selected
from the community in which the case would be tried.
38. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28.
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Two constitutional principles have been the focus of much of
this litigation. One issue involves the necessity of attempting to
identify prospective jurors whose attitudes on race might result in
sentencing decisions in which the race or ethnicity of the defendant,
or the victim, might improperly influence those jurors to impose a
death sentence when a sentence of life imprisonment would have
otherwise been their decision based on the evidence adduced in the
capital trial and sentencing proceeding.39 The problem posed by
racially discriminatory attitudes held by capital jurors is
particularly difficult to address because the remedy almost
necessarily involves self-disclosure of racial animus by prospective
jurors holding such attitudes, an often impossible objective for
defense counsel engaging in even the most thoughtful and probing
examination during voir dire. A second issue, discussed in Subpart
II.B of this Article, involves the use of preemptory challenges to
improperly exclude minorities from capital sentencing juries.
A. Addressing the Problem Posed by Racial Animus Held by
Capital Jurors
One focus of the Court's jurisprudence has been directed at
racial prejudice harbored by jurors themselves, particularly in the
context of capital prosecutions. In 1931, in Aldridge v. United
States,40 the Court recognized the potential for racial prejudice to
improperly influence the capital sentencing decision in a prosecution
of a "negro" defendant charged with the murder of a white police
officer. 41 Defense counsel noted that in a prior trial, a "Southern"
"venireperson" had indicated that she might be influenced by the
fact that a black defendant was charged with the murder of a white
person, and requested the trial court inquire into possible racial
39. I have previously discussed problems arising in the actual use and
enforcement of mechanisms in place designed to address potential sources of
racial discrimination in the capital jury's sentencing process in greater detail in
Lethal Discrimination and Lethal Discrimination 2: Repairing the Remedies for
Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, supra note *. In the first article, I
reviewed in depth the capital sentence of a black capital defendant from Texas,
Gary L. Sterling, who was sentenced to death by an all-white, rural Texas jury
that included one juror who admitted routine use of the word "nigger" when
referring to African Americans. I represented Sterling throughout much of the
post-conviction process. See Sterling v. Cockrell, 100 F. App'x 239, 242-43, (5th
Cir. 2004). In the second article, I advanced general arguments for
strengthening the enforcement of these mechanisms that would, admittedly,
require the Supreme Court to make significant departures from its general
approach in reviewing claims of constitutional error in the post-conviction
process.
40. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
41. Id. at 309 (the Court did not capitalize negro in its opinion).
1116 [Vol. 49
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prejudice on the part of prospective jurors. 42 The trial court refused
the request,43 and the Court reversed.
44
Moreover, the Court recognized the significance of racial
prejudice in capital cases, explaining: "Despite the privileges
accorded to the negro, we do not think that it can be said that the
possibility of such prejudice is so remote as to justify the risk in
forbidding the inquiry. And this risk becomes most grave when the
issue is of life or death."
45
The Court again addressed the need in cross-racial cases for
inquiry into the potential for race-based bias in the attitudes in
potential jurors in Ham v. South Carolina.46 There, the Court
recognized that the risk of racial bias infecting jury deliberations in
criminal cases required an opportunity for a black defendant's trial
counsel to inquire into the potential racial bias of prospective jurors
as an "essential demand of fairness required by [the] Due Process
Clause."
47
42. Id. at 310.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 315. The Court cited a series of decisions rendered by Southern
courts authorizing inquiry into juror bias in cases involving minority
defendants. See Pinder v. State, 8 So. 837, 838-39, 841 (Fla. 1891); Hill v.
State, 72 So. 1003, 1003 (Miss. 1916); State v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 339 (1870); State
v. Sanders, 88 S.E. 10, 12 (S.C. 1916) (noting juror expressed prejudice against
defense counsel based on counsel's race); Fendrick v. State, 45 S.W. 589, 590-91
(Tex. Crim. App. 1898). The Aldridge Court also noted decisions in which
prospective jurors admitting racial prejudice were sua sponte excused by trial
courts. 283 U.S. at 312 & n.2; see also, e.g., State v. Brown, 87 S.W. 519, 522
(Mo. 1905) (holding juror's admitted prejudice not sufficient to demonstrate
ground for disqualification, but recommending seating of unbiased jurors upon
retrial where case reversed and remanded on other grounds); People v. Decker,
51 N.E. 1018, 1020 (N.Y. 1898) (same). It also noted that the inquiry into juror
prejudice extended to permit examination "as to the existence of a disqualifying
state of mind has been upheld with respect to other races than the black race,
and in relation to religious and other prejudices of a serious character."
Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 313 (citing Potter v. State, 216 S.W. 886, 888 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1919)) (approving examination of Jewish venirepersons about bias where
an accused charged with criminal libel in an attack on an individual presumed
to be Jewish, having printed comments linking Jews to routine arson of their
businesses); see also People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102, 103 (1880) (authorizing the
question of a prospective juror regarding the possible prejudice against a
witness based on the witness's Chinese ethnicity); Watson v. Whitney, 23 Cal.
375, 379 (1863) (reversing where the trial court refused to permit voir dire
based on possible prejudice against the "squatters" in a land title action); People
v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, 349 (1855) (inquiry into juror prejudice directed toward
Mexican nationals); Horst v. Silverman, 55 P. 52, 72 (Wash. 1898) (holding it
was proper to inquire of prospective juror regarding a bias against persons of
Jewish faith in a civil action).
45. Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
46. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
47. Id. at 526.
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Further, in Turner v. Murray,48 the Court once again affirmed
the right to voir dire on questions of racial attitudes, holding that in
a death-penalty case in which the defendant and victim were of
different races, the defense was entitled to question prospective
jurors about their racial attitudes to ensure that the penalty is not
imposed based on racially discriminatory views. 49  The Court
observed that racial bias in a capital sentencing proceeding is
particularly problematic:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a
capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for
racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected. On the
facts of this case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence
prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that
belief in deciding whether petitioner's crime involved the
aggravating factors specified under Virginia law. Such a juror
might also be less favorably inclined toward petitioner's
evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance.
More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also
influence a juror's decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which
could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's
crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty. 50
Turner confirmed the Court's long-standing concerns previously
identified with regard to racial prejudice in the administration of
the death penalty. 51
The Court's commitment to voir dire on the question of racial
animus held by prospective jurors has been strained, in a sense, by
an apparent unwillingness to concede the pervasive tendency
toward racial or ethnic bias that may compromise jury decision
making. In Ristaino v. Ross,52 for instance, the Court declined to
mandate questioning of jurors on matters of prejudice when the
suggestion of potential prejudice tainting a verdict lies only in the
cross-racial nature of the case.53  In Ham, the circumstances
suggested a potential motive for the prosecution itself where the
accused, a civil rights activist, argued that his arrest and
prosecution on a drug offense were being undertaken in retaliation
for his community activism. 54 Absent circumstances suggesting a
greater potential for racial bias to influence the jury, the Ristaino
48. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
49. Id. at 35.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 28.
52. 424 U.S. 589 (1979).
53. Id. at 596-97. The case involved a cross-racial offense in which African
Americans were charged with violently assaulting a white security guard, but
not with a capital crime. See id. at 591.
54. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525 (1973).
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Court held that inquiry into bias is not required as a matter of
constitutional right based only on the cross-racial nature of the
offense charged.5 5  Subsequently, in Rosales-Lopez v. United
States,56 the majority reiterated its position, holding:
As Ristaino demonstrates, there is no per se constitutional rule
in such circumstances requiring inquiry as to racial prejudice.
Only when there are more substantial indications of the
likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a
particular case does the trial court's denial of a defendant's
request to examine the jurors' ability to deal impartially with
this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of
discretion.
5 7
The Court did not totally reverse its position regarding the
importance of voir dire as a tool for discovering existence of juror
attitudes on matters of race that might compromise the fairness or
accuracy of their decisions, leaving the issue largely to the discretion
of federal trial judges in assessing the need for specific questioning
in federal trials.5 8 The majority explained the scope of its concern
and decision:
Aldridge and Ristaino together, fairly imply that federal trial
courts must make such an inquiry when requested by a
defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant
and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic
groups. This supervisory rule is based upon and consistent
with the "reasonable possibility standard" articulated above.
It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that violent
crimes perpetrated against members of other racial or ethnic
groups often raise such a possibility. There may be other
circumstances that suggest the need for such an inquiry, but
the decision as to whether the total circumstances suggest a
reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice will affect
the jury remains primarily with the trial court, subject to case-
by-case review by the appellate courts.
59
Rosales-Lopez reflects the Court's appreciation for the fact that
ethnically and racially discriminatory attitudes represent the same
type of bias that may require specific inquiry, and the Court noted
that the trial judge had in fact excluded two prospective jurors based
on responses to the general inquiry that it made.
60
55. 424 U.S. at 596.
56. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
57. Id. at 190.
58. Id. at 189.
59. Id. at 192.
60. Id. at 193 ("[T]he trial court reasonably determined that a juror's
prejudice toward aliens might affect his or her ability to serve impartially in
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Turner remains intact in requiring voir dire on racial or ethnic
prejudice in the context of cross-racial capital prosecutions, but
appears to rest on the potential for improper administration of the
death penalty, rather than a more general concern for juror bias in
the criminal trial process. In this sense, the greater protection,
including constitutionally based protection, afforded for capital
defendants may simply reflect the post-Furman concern that the
death penalty not be imposed on the basis of race or ethnicity of the
accused.
61
But, in practice, reliance on Turner as an effective mechanism
for assessing racial attitudes of prospective jurors is compromised by
the most obviously unreliable part of the process recognized by the
Court: reliance on self-disclosure of racist attitudes by prospective
jurors themselves. 62 The hesitance of prospective jurors-who are
drawn from the community generally and, consequently, are likely
to have extremely diverse perspectives on what constitutes bias and
are also likely to demonstrate substantial differences in terms of
personal insight and sensitivity to issues, even so basic as race and
ethnic discrimination-to provide useful information during voir
dire must be recognized.63 With regard to matters of racial and
ethnic bias, moreover, changing social attitudes toward views
considered unacceptable are strong inducements for those who hold
discriminatory attitudes to deny or minimize this bias.64 Trial
this case. The court, therefore, questioned the prospective jurors as to their
attitudes toward aliens. There can be no doubt that the jurors would have
understood a question about aliens to at least include Mexican aliens. The trial
court excused two jurors for cause, based on their responses to this question.
Removing these jurors eliminated, we believe, any reasonable possibility that
the remaining jurors would be influenced by an undisclosed racial prejudice
toward Mexicans that would have been disclosed by further questioning.").
61. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
62. In Sterling, the capital petitioner challenged the effectiveness of trial
counsel's representation, arguing that counsel's failure to even attempt to voir
dire prospective capital jurors with respect to their attitudes on race
demonstrated defective performance. Sterling v. Dretke, 117 F. App'x 328, 331-
32 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit noted, in response: "While Dunn did not
question any potential jurors about racial bias, he stated this decision rested on
his belief that he very seldom receives truthful answers." Id. at 332. Counsel's
experience is not unusual because jurors are likely to be reluctant to admit
racial bias, or may simply not believe that they possess racially discriminatory
attitudes.
63. Id. at 332.
64. In contrast, it is often rather easy for capital defense counsel to identify
pro-death-penalty attitudes in prospective jurors whose views may be so
extreme with respect to the sentencing issue in a capital prosecution that the
trial court will be compelled to exclude the juror based on his or her inability to
consider the usual alternative sentencing option of life imprisonment. Overall
support for capital punishment in the United States makes such a position
more acceptable in the community, undoubtedly accounting for much of the
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lawyers may have some success in teasing revealing answers from
prospective jurors through careful and deliberate examination, but
there is likely no completely reliable means to make the Turner
remedy available for testing juror bias work effectively in practice.
Perhaps in recognition of the persistent problem of racial
animus and other sources of discrimination held by some capital
jurors and the ineffectiveness of the voir dire as a means for
identifying potential bias compromising the fairness of the capital
sentencing process, the federal capital sentencing process requires
jurors to affirm that their decisions are not the product of
discrimination. 65 The controlling statute provides:
Special precaution to ensure against discrimination.-In a
hearing held before a jury, the court, prior to the return of a
finding under subsection (e), shall instruct the jury that, in
considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall
not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or
sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to
recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it
would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question
no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national
origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be. The
jury, upon return of a finding under subsection (e), shall also
return to the court a certificate, signed by each juror, that
consideration of the race, color, religious beliefs, national
origin, or sex of the defendant or any victim was not involved
in reaching his or her individual decision and that the
individual juror would have made the same recommendation
regarding a sentence for the crime in question no matter what
the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the
defendant or any victim may be.
66
The oath may prompt some jurors, upon reflection, to address
potential bias individually and to address the problem of unfairness
in the sentencing decision, but it would seem likely that jurors open
to this insight would be most likely to disclose these concerns in
response to questioning during voir dire. Prospective jurors whose
willingness of many venirepersons to openly express opposition, or even
hostility, to mitigation or mercy-based sentences in capital cases. Gallup
polling in 2009 and 2010 (half sample) showed overall support for capital
punishment at 64-65% in the United States. See Death Penalty, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
The Supreme Court has held that capital defendants have a right to question
prospective jurors directly about predisposition with respect to the use of the
death penalty. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 722, 735-36 (1992) (Illinois
procedure required the trial court, rather than defense counsel, to conduct voir
dire).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(f) (2012).
66. Id.
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personal prejudices are held more maliciously would seem less likely
to be affected by the oath, perhaps in part because they either
simply deny the existence of prejudice or rationalize it in their lives
as justified. The ultimate effect of the requirement that jurors
certify that their decisions have not been influenced by race,
ethnicity, or other inappropriate factors may be to offer a
meaningless and rather cynical basis for concluding that improper
bias has not contributed to the decision to impose a death sentence.
B. Racial Discrimination in the Capital Jury Selection Process
The second issue addresses the use of peremptory challenges by
the prosecution to exclude members of cognizable groups from jury
service. 67 The exclusion of minority jurors from service on capital
juries has been defined within the larger context of discriminatory
exclusion of minorities from jury service generally.
68
In Batson v. Kentucky,69 the Court reaffirmed the basic right of
citizens to participate in the civic event of jury service70 and, by
extension, recognized an implicit right of litigants not to be
subjected to trial before juries from which minority citizens had
been excluded through discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.
71
However, in practice, enforcement of Batson has proved uneven,
as evident in two important capital cases in which the Supreme
Court has been forced to deal with the hesitance of lower courts to
look beyond claims of nondiscriminatory intent advanced by
prosecutors using peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors
from service in state death-penalty cases. 72 At least in part, the
discretion of trial judges to accept such claims without greater
67. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (exclusion
based on gender).
68. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
69. Id.
70. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879). The
discriminatory exclusion of minority jurors through the exercise of peremptory
challenges was similarly held unconstitutional in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 222-24 (1965).
71. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)
(holding that a claim of discriminatory use of peremptories to exclude black
jurors may be made by white defendant in criminal trial). The Batson principle
was extended to preclude discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against
prospective jurors based on gender in J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135-137, 137 n.6. The
prohibition against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was applied to
criminal defendants in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992). And
Batson was extended to prohibit use of peremptories in a discriminatory
manner by counsel in civil litigation in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 617 (1991).
72. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231 (2005).
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skepticism must be traced to the Court's decision in Purkett v.
Elem, 73 where the majority essentially insulated the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors from
aggressive scrutiny provided the prosecutor offered a race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory strike, regardless of how unimpressive
or insincere the reasoning supporting the explanation might be.
74
Long-term resolution of the problems posed by discriminatory
practice in the use of peremptory challenges almost certainly
requires reconsideration of the role played by exclusion of jurors
based on subjective perceptions of counsel with respect to the
predisposition of venirepersons. In Wilkerson v. Texas,75 Justice
Marshall, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, explained the
fundamental problem:
Batson's greatest flaw is its implicit assumption that courts
are capable of detecting race-based challenges to Afro-
American jurors. Assuming good faith on the part of all
involved, Batson's mandate requires the parties "to confront
and overcome their own racism on all levels," a most difficult
challenge to meet. This flaw has rendered Batson ineffective
against all but the most obvious examples of racial prejudice-
the cases in which a proffered "neutral explanation" plainly
betrays an underlying impermissible purpose. To excuse such
prejudice when it does surface, on the ground that a prosecutor
can also articulate nonracial factors for his challenges, would
be absurd. Batson would thereby become irrelevant, and
racial discrimination in jury selection, perhaps the greatest
embarrassment in the administration of our criminal justice
system, would go undeterred. If such "smoking guns" are
ignored, we have little hope of combating the more subtle
forms of racial discrimination.
76
Justice Marshall argued for elimination of all peremptory
challenges, echoing his position in his concurring opinion in
Batson.77
73. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
74. But this is not to say that the moral authority of Batson is wholly
lacking. In State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673 (Mo. 2007), the Missouri
Supreme Court reviewed the prosecutor's claim that juror "S.H." was
peremptorily struck because of the juror's "crazy" red hair and neat appearance.
Noting the trial court's initial reluctance to accept the prosecutor's explanation
as race-neutral, the court concluded: "Viewing the totality of circumstances-the
prosecution's disdain for S.H.'s red hair, his scrutiny of her lack of driver's
license, and his misperception of her reaction as hostile-the prosecution's
subjective assumptions about S.H. are far from neutral." Id. at 676.
75. 493 U.S. 924 (1989).
76. Id. at 928 (Marhall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Batson,
476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
77. 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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In both Miller-El v. Dretke78 and Snyder v. Louisiana,79 the
Court's frustration over lower court deference to facially acceptable
explanations for peremptory strikes directed against black jurors
that would prove only superficial upon further scrutiny was
apparent. In Miller-El, for instance, the Court rejected the findings
of Texas courts that lower federal courts had relied upon in ruling
that an apparent systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude
minority jurors from the capital trial of a minority defendant did not
demonstrate racially discriminatory action by a Dallas County,
Texas, prosecutor.8 0 The lengthy litigation history in the case
suggests the difficulty that capital litigants with meritorious claims
must overcome in convincing reviewing courts that exclusion of
minority jurors from capital jury service reflects prosecutors'
discriminatory intent.81
Similarly, the extended litigation in Snyder v. Louisiana
demonstrates the same sort of unreasoned deference to trial court
fact finding or explanations offered by prosecutors in the jury-
selection process during direct appeals in state courts.8 2 In Snyder,
the Court eventually rejected the conclusions of Louisiana state
courts that a prosecutor's peremptory challenge excluding a
minority juror from service in a capital trial was constitutionally
acceptable after its original remand for reconsideration had resulted
in the state supreme court maintaining its position in deferring to
the trial court's rejection of the capital defendant's Batson
challenge.8 3 The state trial court had offered no subjective ground
for accepting the prosecutor's purportedly race-neutral explanation
for the strike, affording the Snyder majority the option to essentially
render judgment in reversing the state court.8 4
The prosecutor's peremptory strike in Snyder excluded a
minority juror who expressed concern that his participation as a
capital juror would interfere with completion of the student teaching
requirement to earn his education degree.8 5  But subsequent
information showed that the expected duration of the trial would not
78. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
79. 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
80. 545 U.S. at 234.
81. See Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 534 U.S. 1122 (2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 322
(2003), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir.
2004).
82. See State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832 (La. 1999), rev'd, 874 So. 2d 739 (La.
2004) (vacating the judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of the
Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)), cert. granted, 545
U.S. 1137 (2006), rev'd and remanded, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
83. 545 U.S. at 1137.
84. 552 U.S. at 484-86.
85. Id. at 479-80.
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actually present the juror with any problem in completing the
required student teaching experience.8 6 A white juror, who was not
struck and was subject to considerable rehabilitation by the
prosecutor, advised the court that he was a contractor with two
houses under construction that required completion before buyers
could move in, and, additionally, he disclosed a family problem:
"[M]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so I'm running the kids back
and forth to school, and we're not originally from here, so I have no
family in the area, so between the two things, it's kind of bad timing
for me."87 The prosecutor accepted this white juror.88 The Snyder
Court looked to the disparity in examination of white and black
jurors and the prosecutor's decision to retain a white juror whose
situation was almost identical to that of the excluded black
venireperson, rejecting the explanation that the black juror
appeared "nervous" as a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of
its peremptory challenge.8 9 Because the trial judge had made no
specific finding concerning the prospective juror's demeanor,90 the
Court relied on a comparative analysis of the circumstances
surrounding the prosecutor's acceptance of the white juror and
exclusion of the black juror 9' in reaching its conclusion that the
state courts committed clear error in accepting the prosecutor's
exercise of the peremptory as racially neutral.
92
Miller-El and Snyder demonstrate both the difficulty in
enforcing the guarantee of Batson and the ultimate power resting
with the Supreme Court to force state and federal courts to honor
the promise of capital juries selected without racially discriminatory
prosecutorial tactics designed to frustrate Batson,93 which itself had
86. Id. at 480-82.
87. Id. at 484.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 479, 485-86.
90. Id. at 479. The Court has routinely reviewed claims of improper
exclusion of prospective jurors with deference to the findings of trial courts. See
e.g., Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2007) (noting the trial court's superior
position in evaluating the demeanor of prospective jurors justifying deference to
the trial-court findings). The trial court's evaluation of the prospective juror's
demeanor was also addressed in Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006). There, the
Court overruled the Ninth Circuit in finding the trial court's acceptance of the
prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge where the
trial judge stated on the record that he did not observe the juror "rolling his
eyes," a basis for strike advanced by prosecutor, but nevertheless found the
prosecutor's stated additional concern for the juror's youth was a credible,
acceptable explanation for strike. Id. at 336-37.
91. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-84.
92. Id. at 485-86.
93. Not only do the lengthy litigation histories in Miller-El and Snyder
reflect the difficulty in overcoming lower court deference to prosecution
explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude minority
jurors from service on capital juries, but these are not necessarily isolated cases.
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resulted from the failures of the Court's pronouncement in Strauder
v. West Virginia94 and the Court's remedy recognized in Swain v.
Alabama.95 Moreover, Miller-El and Snyder also highlight the
problem in enforcement of Batson in which the Supreme Court's
directive in each case has failed to drive lower court decision
making; that, in itself, may illustrate the weakness of its moral
authority in imposing compliance with its substantive decisions.
More recently, the Court's orders in Thaler v. Haynes96 and
Felker v. Jackson,97 both rendered per curiam, suggest that the
Court's position in Snyder does not herald a more aggressive
approach to review of Batson issues than traditional deference to
trial court findings. In Thaler, the Court's order rejected reliance on
Snyder for the proposition that a prosecutor's explanation that the
exclusion of a prospective juror was based on the juror's demeanor,
rather than race, required any finding that the trial judge had
personally observed and noted the demeanor concerning the
prosecutor in order to be upheld.
98
Similarly, in Felker, when the Ninth Circuit summarily
reversed a finding that minority jurors had not been peremptorily
struck based on race in a California trial,99 the Court reversed the
circuit court, pointing to its lack of reasoning in failing to defer to
state court findings in the federal habeas process.10 0 The Court's
reversal may well be justified in light of the dearth of reasoning
related in the circuit court's opinion, evidenced particularly by the
lack of any dissent from any of the Justices who had joined in
reversing the lower courts in Miller-El and Snyder.O1 Nevertheless,
For instance, in another case arising in Dallas County, Texas, Reed v.
Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit granted federal
habeas relief, ordering a new trial for a Texas inmate who had spent thirty
years on death row based on his claim that prosecutors had discriminatorily
removed minority jurors through the exercise of their peremptory challenges
during the selection of his capital trial jury. Id. at 365 ("This case has spent
three decades winding its way through the state and federal court systems.
Today, we add to that lengthy history by concluding that Reed is entitled to
habeas corpus relief for his Batson claim.").
94. In 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879). In Strauder, the Court held the statutory
exclusion of African Americans from jury service unconstitutional. Id. at 303.
The discriminatory exclusion of minority jurors through exercise of peremptory
challenges was similarly held unconstitutional in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 222-24 (1965).
95. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
96. 559 U.S. 43 (2010).
97. 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011).
98. 559 U.S. at 47.
99. Jackson v. Felker, 389 F. App'x. 640, 641 (9th Cir. 2010).
100. Felker, 131 S. Ct. at 1307-08. The Court observed that the Ninth
Circuit's "decision is as inexplicable as it is unexplained." Id. at 1307.
101. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231 (2005).
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it stands as a harsh reminder to lower courts that federal habeas
court interference in state proceedings is likely to be scrutinized
unfavorably. This suggests that the deferential posture criticized by
the Court with respect to the Fifth Circuit's hesitance to reject the
findings of Texas courts in Miller-El still remains a somewhat safer
road in decision making, 0 2 given the likelihood that the Court will
not expand its certiorari docket in significant numbers necessary to
review the cases in which racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges could almost certainly be claimed.
The issues raised by the Turner v. Murray and Batson lines of
cases reflect the problem of addressing actual prejudice likely to
result from racism and racial discrimination, respectively, in the
trial process. The remedies recognized by the Court in addressing
racial bias held by individual jurors and the institutional
discrimination that results when jury selection tactics employed by
prosecutors are designed to reduce the potential influence of
minority jurors' service in the capital trial process demonstrate that
the Supreme Court has been aware of the threat to the integrity of
the criminal justice process generally, and capital sentencing,
specifically, over much of the nation's post-Civil War history. Yet,
the continuing rounds of litigation with regard to both problems also
serve to demonstrate that the Court's efforts have often proved
inadequate to address the ongoing problems of racial discrimination
as they infect the criminal trial process and compromise fairness in
capital sentencing.
III. DEATH QUALIFICATION OF CAPITAL JURORS
In the context of capital prosecutions, the Court has not only
traditionally been concerned with the often interrelated goals of
ensuring that African Americans not be excluded from jury service,
an act of citizenship, on the basis of racial attitudes and eliminating
the influence of racial animus or discrimination from infecting the
capital sentencing process.10 3 It has also addressed the general
fairness of capital sentencing in terms of the attitudes of individual
venirepersons toward the death penalty. 104 The issue arose in
Witherspoon v. Illinois105 in the context of a capital prosecution in
which opposition to the death penalty resulted in the exclusion of a
prospective juror from service on a capital trial jury. 10 6 The majority
102. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (highlighting the Court's
preference for deference to trial court decision making in Uttecht v. Brown and
Rice v. Collins).
103. See, e.g., Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476-77; State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451
(1905).
104. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
105. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
106. Id. at 513-14.
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drew a rather fluid line in determining when a juror's attitudes or
beliefs with regard to the death penalty would serve,
constitutionally, to warrant their exclusion from service as a matter
of law, rather than as a matter of trial tactics. 107 It concluded that
blanket preclusion from service is not justified in every instance in
which the prospective juror expresses general opposition or
reservations about use of the penalty, or service on a jury that might
be called upon to consider imposition of a death sentence. 108
But the Witherspoon majority also recognized that a juror's
opposition to a legislatively authorized and constitutional penalty
option could readily jeopardize the prosecution's good faith reliance
on the penalty as a sentencing option, when appropriate on the facts
of a given case. 0 9 Consequently, the majority fashioned a rule
attempting to balance the State's interest in empanelling a capital
jury capable of considering the death penalty as a sentencing option
with countervailing interests of the accused-and, presumably, the
community-in not arbitrarily excluding individuals from service for
whom the death penalty might prove intellectually or emotionally
troubling, but whose views did not foreclose the possibility of its
imposition.110
Exclusion of those jurors expressing opposition to capital
punishment is not a simple matter. Jurors whose opposition to
capital punishment will not impair their ability to consider either
the guilt/innocence or punishment stage evidence fairly and render a
decision consistent with the evidence are not subject to
disqualification under Witherspoon."' This requires the trial court
to carefully apply the standard imposed by the Court with respect to
the many prospective capital jurors who bring seemingly
inconsistent views on the death penalty to court. Moreover, the
erroneous exclusion of even one prospective juror not properly
excluded under Witherspoon has consistently been held to taint a
death sentence imposed by a jury from which a Witherspoon-eligible
juror has been excluded, requiring the death sentence to be
vacated. 112 But the decision concerning the qualification of a juror
107. Id. at 518.
108. Id. at 522-23.
109. Id. at 513-14.
110. Id. at 514-23, 514 n.7. The majority explained that "[i]t is entirely
possible, of course, that even a juror who believes that capital punishment
should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition could
nonetheless subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty
to abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State." Id. at 514 n.7.
111. Id.at521.
112. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262
(1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969). When the State argued that it
would have peremptorily challenged a prospective juror who expressed
opposition to capital punishment, but who was not properly excluded under
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to serve is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. 113 Trial
judges-whether supporting capital punishment or deferring to the
judgment of the legislature in adopting it and prosecutors choosing
to seek it-are likely to exclude many jurors whose hesitance about
imposing a death sentence suggest difficulty in serving or arriving
at a verdict. 1
14
Thus, the Court's Witherspoon rationale for qualification of
capital jurors only authorizes the exclusion of a venireperson whose
personal opposition to the death penalty unequivocally compromises
their ability to consider either the accused's guilt or punishment in
the event of conviction if a potential sentence is death. Witherspoon
expanded upon the claim that disqualification of opponents of
capital punishment was constitutionally impermissible. 115 The
petitioner argued that exclusion of opponents of the death sentence
would not only deny him a representative cross section of
community attitudes toward capital sentencing, but also result in a
jury predisposed toward conviction. 1 6 This argument was rejected
by the majority as unsupported by the evidence offered in support of
the position. 117 However, the Court subsequently recognized that a
capital defendant must be entitled to inquire as to whether a
prospective juror would always vote in favor of imposing a death
sentence after convicting for a capital offense in Morgan v.
Illinois.11 8
Morgan provides some protection" 9 against selection of a
capital sentencing jury unequivocally supportive of capital
sentencing without regard to the specific facts of the offense or the
Witherspoon using a strike not exercised at trial, the Court rejected the
argument that it could retroactively correct the trial court's error. Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 665 (1987).
113. See generally Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
114. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-34 (providing that a trial judge's determination of
a juror's ability to serve is entitled to deference on appeal and in federal habeas
process).
115. 391 U.S. at 516-18.
116. Id. at 516-18. The majority rejected petitioner Witherspoon's
argument that jurors qualified to serve based upon their support or acceptance
of the death penalty would be more likely to ignore the presumption of
innocence and convict, and instead accepted the prosecution's theory of the case,
finding Witherspoon's supporting empirical evidence to be insufficient,
concluding that there was an insufficient showing "that the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue
of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction." Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
at 513.
117. Id. at 517 & n.10.
118. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
119. This presupposes, of course, honest and accurate responses to capital
defense counsel's inquiry concerning sentencing or punishment attitudes of
venirepersons.
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character of the accused. 120 In a sense, it implicitly offsets, to some
extent, the lack of recognition of anti-capital punishment sentiment
in the community from which the jury is selected. 121
Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion in Uttecht v.
Brown,122 "Millions of Americans oppose the death penalty," and
that "a cross section of virtually every community in the country
includes citizens who firmly believe the death penalty is unjust but
who nevertheless are qualified to serve as jurors in capital cases."123
However, those jurors who oppose capital punishment are subject to
exclusion if unable to convince trial judges of their ability to serve
despite that opposition, essentially putting aside personal views
about the penalty, and agreeing to decide cases based solely on the
evidence presented.124  The Uttecht majority observed: "Capital
defendants have the right to be sentenced by an impartial jury. The
State may not infringe this right by eliminating from the venire
those whose scruples against the death penalty would not
substantially impair the performance of their duties."125 But the
majority continued: "Courts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt
error, however, especially federal courts considering habeas
petitions, owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior
position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential
juror."126
Thus, even jurors not disqualified under the rigorous test of
Witherspoon, or watered-down versions applied by trial judges, 127
are still subject to exclusion through the exercise of peremptory
strikes by prosecutors.1 28 Death-qualified capital juries arguably
reflect a skewed view of capital punishment through Witherspoon
120. Morgan, 504 U.S. at 725.
121. See id. at 745.
122. 551 U.S. 1 (2007).
123. Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 38.
125. Id. at 22 (majority opinion).
126. Id.
127. The exclusion of Juror Z in Uttecht was based on the perceived
confusion of the jury with regard to the sentencing options and the test that the
juror would employ before imposing a death sentence, despite the juror's
affirmance of capital punishment and explanation that he believed it should be
reserved for the most serious cases. Id. at 13-15.
128. For example, in the Texas capital prosecution in Sterling v. State, 830
S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), trial counsel objected to the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude two black jurors. The claimed Batson
violation failed at trial and on appeal with respect to both excluded jurors, one
of whom clearly disqualified herself from service due to her unqualified
opposition to the death penalty and her concessions that she would deliberately
vote in such a way to avoid its imposition. Id. at 118-19. Although the juror
could have properly been excluded under Witherspoon, the State's decision to
use a peremptory challenge to strike her was readily defensible as based on a
race-neutral reason.
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exclusion of what might be considered absolutist opponents of the
death penalty or as a result of prosecution strikes based on less
inflexible opposition to the penalty. Regardless, the result is that
capital juries will necessarily tend to be more prosecution oriented
in capital cases as a result of personal views of the death penalty by
prospective jurors.
The issue of death qualification of capital jurors was addressed
in Lockhart v. McCree,129 where the Court held that disqualification
under Witherspoon did not compromise the fairness of the capital
sentencing process by excluding from jury service a significant
population within the community evidencing a different view of the
death penalty. 130 The Court rejected the argument that exclusion of
capital punishment opponents resulted in a jury more prone to
convict.' 3 ' The petitioner argued that assuming that Witherspoon
correctly held that jurors opposed to the death penalty could be
properly excluded from service on capital juries because they would
not or could not follow the law in considering sentencing options
that would include death, 132 those qualified jurors would be unfairly
predisposed toward conviction.
1 33
One suggested resolution of the problem of a capital jury
predisposed to convict would be the empanelling of a Witherspoon
qualified jury for sentencing only, bifurcating not only the
guilt/innocence and punishment phases of the capital trial, but also
requiring that each be tried before a different jury. 134 In this
scenario, the jury selected for the guilt/innocence trial would not be
death qualified under Witherspoon. 35  This alternative was
unacceptable to the majority as a constitutional requirement.
3 6
129. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
130. Id. at 173.
131. Id. at 167.
132. Id. at 170 & n.7.
133. The Eighth Circuit accepted this premise and the social-science
evidence offered in support of this claim. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 229
(8th Cir. 1985). During the course of litigation in the lower courts, McCree's
claim had been consolidated with a prior case, but the petitioner, Grigsby, died
during the course of litigation. Id. at 229. Lockhart was substituted in as
respondent once he was appointed Director of the Arkansas Department of
Corrections. Id. at 226.
134. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 184, 204-05 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(explaining the use of separate juries for guilt/innocence and punishment
determinations in capital cases). The Witherspoon Court anticipated the
argument in favor of the use of separate juries. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 520 & n.18 (1968).
135. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 204-05. However, since the jury charged with
sentencing would be entitled to consider the facts of the offense in assessing the
propriety of imposing the death penalty, the State would arguably find it
necessary to present its case on guilt/innocence to a second jury, and the
defense would presumably elect to respond with any defense asserted at trial if
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Possibly the most critical factor in the prosecutor's decision in
exercising her peremptory challenges in a capital trial is the
attitudes toward the death penalty expressed by prospective jurors
who are not excluded from service based on Witherspoon.'37 Many
jurors may have reservations about personally being involved in the
imposition of a death sentence, yet support it as a matter of policy
and personal belief.138 These jurors, reticent about actual service,
were targeted by the Texas statute reviewed by the Court in Adams
v. Texas,1 39 which required exclusion of prospective jurors who could
not "take an oath that the mandatory penalty of death or
imprisonment for life would not 'affect [their] deliberations on any
issue of fact."' 14 0  The Court held that this requirement violated
Witherspoon.1
4 1
Thus, while Witherspoon disqualification itself may skew juries
in favor of imposition of the death penalty, as well as resulting in
capital juries predisposed toward conviction, qualification itself
actually represents only the first step in reducing minority juror
participation in capital cases. Not only does the qualification
process promote compliance with the law in terms of ensuring that
jurors selected for service on capital cases are prepared to enforce
the law adopted by the legislature by voting on the basis of evidence
that will lead to execution, but it opens the door to a secondary
concern. Prosecutors are not only interested in qualification of
capital juries under Witherspoon, but also in learning about the
attitudes of prospective jurors and using that information as a basis
material to the question of sentence, even though the judgment of conviction
would bar reconsideration of the actual issue of the accused's guilt.
136. The Lockhart Court noted that it had upheld the Georgia statute
against a challenge based upon the statutory requirement that the same jury
serve both in the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of the capital trial. Id.
at 180 (majority opinion) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158 (1976)).
The majority then noted that Arkansas had made a similar policy choice for the
use of unitary juries in criminal cases that decide all issues relating to guilt and
punishment. Id. Arkansas subsequently changed its approach, requiring
bifurcation of the trial process. See Buckley v. State, 76 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Ark.
2002) ("Since 1993, Arkansas law has provided for a bifurcated-sentencing
procedure, with guilt and sentence being determined by a jury at separate
phases. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-97-101 (Supp. 2001) governs this
procedure.").
137. See, e.g., Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("Permitting prosecutors to take into
account the concerns expressed about capital punishment by prospective jurors,
or any other factor, in exercising peremptory challenges simply does not
implicate the concerns expressed in Witherspoon.").
138. Id. at 943.
139. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
140. Id. at 38, 40, 42 & n.1 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (West
1974)).
141. Id. at 40.
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for further peremptory challenges in assembling capital juries. Both
death qualification and legitimate exercise of peremptory
challenges-that being, the use of peremptory challenges to exclude
jurors based on legitimate factors, meaning factors not based on
racial or ethnic stereotyping or active bias-serve as a basis for
disqualifying potential jurors.
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA POSED BY DEATH QUALIFICATION
The goal of seating racially diverse and unbiased juries charged
with the determination of whether to impose a death sentence in a
capital case is designed to ensure that the capital sentencing process
is free from both actual taint and the perception of taint attributable
to racial or ethnic characteristics of capital crimes or individuals
either charged with capital offenses or their victims. One factor of
particular significance in assessing the likely impact of racial
discrimination in the operation of the death penalty lies in the
demographic characteristics of those jurisdictions in which capital
sentencing is an option. For instance, one study suggests that use of
the death penalty is associated with two significant factors for the
fair use of capital sentencing, a relatively high percentage of black
and Hispanic minority populations and economic inequality within
the state's population. 142 Thus, while the potential pool of minority
jurors should be favorable in terms of ensuring fairness in
representation on capital jury panels, the same demographic factors
may also increase disparity in the use of the penalty against
minority defendants, who are also likely to reflect the lower end of
the range of economic disparity. Consequently, in evaluating the
death-qualification process in light of the attitudes and experiences
of prospective capital jurors, it will be important to consider the
impact of disparate attitudes within ethnic groups toward capital
punishment in understanding why capital juries are more likely to
be less representative of the demographic character of the
community than population percentages might otherwise suggest.
Because opposition to the death penalty is disproportionately
greater within the black community that in the white community,
even the greater percentage of African Americans in traditional
death-penalty states may not be reflected in greater representation
on capital juries.
143
142. See David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the
Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 109-31
(2002).
143. This disparity is documented in the Equal Justice Institute study
documenting racial underrepresentation in capital juries in the South. See
STEVENSON, supra note 26.
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A. Disparity in Support for Capital Punishment Among Majority
and Minority Groups
A central problem at the heart of any attempt to eliminate the
impact of race-based discrimination, particularly discrimination
against African Americans, in the use of the death penalty involves
the significant variance between majority and minority populations
in attitudes toward the death penalty. 144 Research consistently
shows that African Americans are more likely to oppose the use of
capital punishment than whites. 145 A 2004 Gallup Research poll
confirmed this disparity.
146
The Gallup results show that over the period 2001-2004,
support for the death penalty among whites averaged 71%, while
support among African Americans surveyed stood at 44%.147 The
report notes that this disparity may have a discernible cause related
to statistically significantly higher numbers of African Americans,
than whites, on death row:
This stark difference may be the result of the ongoing debate
about the overrepresentation of blacks on death rows across
the country. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that
there were 3,374 prisoners on death row in 2003, of which
1,418 were black and 1,878 were white. Blacks represent 42%
of the inmates on death row, but only 12% of the nation's
population. 148
Other research confirms the results 149 reported by Gallup and
other polling groups. 150 These results may also reflect disparity in
144. See Joseph Carroll, Who Supports the Death Penalty?, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CENTER (Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
/article.php?did=1266&scid.
145. See id.
146. Id. (noting that "[r]esults are based on telephone interviews with 6,498
national adults, aged 18 and older, conducted Feb. 19-21, 2001; May 10-14,
2001; Oct. 11-14, 2001; May 6-9, 2002; Oct. 14-17, 2002; May 5-7, 2003; Oct 6-
9, 2003; May 2-4, 2004; and Oct. 11-14, 2004. For results based on the total
sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum
margin of sampling error is A±2 percentage points.").
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, Reassessing the Racial
Divide in Support for Capital Punishment, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 124
(2007), available at http://jrc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/44/1/124. The
authors conclude that there is a substantial gap in support for capital
punishment among black and white Americans, and that common factors that
might be expected to produce more consistency in support, such as class,
confidence in government, conservative politics, regional location, and religious
fundamentalism, either did little to narrow the divide or had only modest
effects. Id. at 125. Ultimately, they conclude that differences in attitudes
toward capital punishment among whites and African Americans will remain a
source of contention in the respective group perceptions of fairness in the
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more general attitudes held by black and white Americans toward
the criminal justice system. 51
However, polling also shows that support for the death penalty
fluctuates over time, including attitudes held by non-whites. 152 In
the most recent Gallup poll addressing majority and minority
attitudes toward the death penalty from October 2010, the results
actually showed that the disparity in support has lessened when
whites and non-whites were polled, 153 with 69% of whites surveyed
indicating support for the death penalty and 26% opposing.
154
Among nonwhites surveyed, the figures showed 55% supporting and
37% opposing the death penalty. 55 However, these figures are not
operation of the criminal justice system in the United States. See id. Similar
findings were reported by John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, The
Enduring Racial Divide in Death Penalty Support, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 85, 85-99
(2006), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii
/S0047235205000991#.
150. See Trends in Attitudes Toward Religion and Social Issues: 1987-2007,
PEW RES. CENTER (Mar. 21, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/614
/religion-social-issues. This report showed long-term trends similar to the
results reported by Gallup, concluding:
Support for the death penalty for persons convicted of murder is
somewhat lower now than it was in the late 1990s, but opinions have
changed little since 2001. Currently, 64% favor the death penalty,
while 29% oppose it. Support is higher among men (68%) than women
(60%), and is substantially higher among whites (69%) than among
African Americans (44%) and Hispanics (45%). More Republicans
than Democrats favor the death penalty, but even among the latter, a
small majority does so (56%, vs. 78% for Republicans).
Id. However, a more recent Pew poll showed more support for the death
penalty among some Hispanics, with 57% of Hispanic Catholics and 52%
generally who were surveyed in 2011, supporting the death penalty. Continued
Majority Support for the Death Penalty, PEW RES. CENTER (Jan. 2012), available
at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/1-6-12%2ODeath%20penalty
%20release.pdf.
151. E.g., Trusting the System: Democrats v. Republicans, FDU P,UBLICMIND
(Oct. 7, 2006), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/cj0610/. The report included the
following observation about polling results for Delaware voters:
Differences can also be found in the perceptions of Delaware's black
and white registered voters. Blacks expressed less trust in all aspects
of the criminal justice system than whites. For example, 82% of white
respondents and 63% of blacks say they have "some" or "a lot" of trust
in the ability of police investigators to collect and process evidence,
such as DNA and fingerprints, correctly. Blacks were also more likely
to say they are opposed to the death penalty. Half of all black
respondents are opposed compared to around a fifth of whites.
Id.
152. Continued Majority Support for the Death Penalty, supra note 150.
153. Frank Newport, In U.S., 64% Support Death Penalty in Cases of
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based upon surveys focused only on African Americans, when
compared with whites, and the closing disparity may actually
indicate that other groups included in the "non-white" category of
respondents, such as Latinos/Hispanics, approve of capital
punishment at higher rates than African Americans. 156  This
explanation for the less severe departure in support is certainly
consistent with other polling over time focusing on attitudes within
the black community.
The disparity in support for capital punishment between white
and black Americans suggests serious potential compromise of
public confidence in the death penalty, particularly in light of
developments pertaining to exonerations of death row inmates based
on newly available DNA evidence. 157 Within both minority and
majority communities, concern that the death penalty has been
discriminatorily used against minority defendants reflects the basic
unfairness in the administration of the capital sentencing system. 158
This concern is understandably compounded by revelations that
significant numbers of innocent individuals have suffered
conviction, and exoneration of death row inmates raises the specter
of imposition of the most final of punishments on innocent
individuals who have already been executed. 159 The Death Penalty
Information Center currently reports that "[slince 1973, 140 people
[in 26 states] have been exonerated and freed from death row" with
evidence of their innocence. 160
In a compelling study of racial attitudes toward the death
penalty,' 1 political scientists Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz
confirmed the disparity in support for capital punishment among
whites and African Americans surveyed. 62 They also note that
support generally fell in the late 1990s, attributed in part to the
increasing disclosure of exonerations of death row inmates based on
exculpating DNA evidence and declining crime rates. 163  In
examining existing scholarship and interpreting their own survey
156. See Continued Majority Support for the Death Penalty, supra note 150.
157. Trusting the System Democrats v. Republicans, supra note 151.
158. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 149, at 130.
159. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Sept.
7, 2014).
160. Id.
161. Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the
Death Penalty in America, 51 AM. J. POL. ScI. 996, 996 (2007).
162. Id. at 999.
163. Id. at 996-97 (citing Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna De Boef & Amber
E. Boydstun, An Evolutionary Factor Analysis Approach to the Study of Issue
Definition (May 11, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-fbaum/Innocence/BaumgartnerDeBoefBoydstunMPSA_
2004_corrected.pdf (presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association)).
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data, however, Peffley and Hurwitz conclude that support for the
death penalty among both whites and African Americans tends to
drop when survey respondents were presented with the additional
consideration that flaws in the system may be resulting in the
execution of too many innocent people.164 But the drop in support
was substantially smaller among white respondents than among
African Americans. 1
65
Prior survey data found that support for the death penalty
among whites tends to increase with other evidence of racially
discriminatory attitudes toward African Americans, 166 much as
racial prejudice among whites has been argued as correlating with
more punitive attitudes. 167 Even more troubling for Peffley and
Hurwitz than the minimal level of drop in support for the death
penalty among whites when queried about the factor of execution of
innocent individuals, was their finding that among white
respondents, support for capital punishment actually increases when
the survey included a different factor-racially disproportionate use
of the death penalty against African Americans. 168 They also note
their prior research, "documenting a naive faith among whites that
the criminal justice system is racially fair."
169
The data and conclusions reached by social-science researchers
are particularly devastating to any perception that attitudes toward
capital punishment or the criminal justice system generally are not
significant indicators of racial bias, particularly as the survey data
might reasonably be viewed within the black community.170 To the
extent that significant white support for the death penalty is
influenced by racially discriminatory attitudes toward African
164. Id. at 1002 tbl.1.
165. Id.
166. See Stevan E. Barkan & Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudice and Support
for the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 202, 202-09
(1994) (concluding that support for the death penalty among whites is
attributable to racial prejudice against African Americans); Lawrence D. Bobo
& Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White Americans' Views
on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DuBois REV. 1 (2004); Joe Soss,
Laura Langbein & Alan R. Metelko, Why Do White Americans Support the
Death Penalty?, 65 J. OF POL. 397, 397-421 (2003).
167. Soss, Langbein & Metelko, supra note 166, at 399. The Peffley &
Hurwitz study found that, contrary to Soss, Langheim, and Metelko, survey
data did not support the conclusion that antiblack stereotypes influence white
support for the death penalty. See Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 161, at 1005.
168. Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 161, at 1002 tbl.1.
169. Id. at 1000 (quoting Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, The Racial
Component of "Race Neutral" Crime Policy Attitudes, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 59, 59-
75 (2002)).
170. See, e.g., id. (documenting the changes in support for the death penalty
when different races are involved).
20141 1137
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
Americans,171 the disparity in support among whites and African
Americans is particularly significant because it signifies that
African Americans may correctly view the death penalty as a policy
choice designed to implement an agenda of official oppression
through the criminal justice system.172  It certainly provides
evidentiary support for this position. Moreover, Peffley and Hurwitz
suggest that antipathy toward the death penalty in the black
community may be attributed, in part, "to negative attitudes toward
whites, who for some blacks, may be viewed as part of the power
structure that uses the death penalty as a discriminatory tool."'173
Perhaps even more important is that the research suggests that
disparity in support for the death penalty among whites and African
Americans is the possible link to overall attitudes toward crime,
crime suppression, and punishment demonstrated in responses from
the two groups.174 Peffley and Hurwitz suggest that a difference in
attitudes toward crime within the two communities impact their
views of punishment. 175 Individuals who believe that crime is the
product of deficiencies in character are generally more likely to be
punitive and support capital punishment, while those who tend to
view crime as the result of external conditions, such as poverty or
poor economic conditions, are more likely to support a rehabilitation
model of punishment. 176 Peffley and Hurwitz conclude, as have
earlier researchers, 177 that while support for noncapital punishment
is roughly equal between whites and African Americans, the
underlying attitudinal framework differs: whites tend to view crime
as the product of internal factors, for example, character deficiency,
and thus, punishment is retributive; while African Americans
support punishment because of fear of victimization, for example,
that external factors will result in them becoming crime victims. 178
171. Id. at 999 ("There seems to be little doubt that, at least for whites,
racial attitudes often affect their support for capital punishment.").
172. Id..at 1001 ("[T]here is abundant evidence that African Americans
regard the U.S. criminal justice system as inherently unfair-i.e., that it
discriminates against them on the streets and in the courts. For this reason,
blacks do not need any reminder of the racially-discriminatory nature of the
death penalty."); see also Janet L. Lauritsen & Robert J. Sampson, Minorities,
Crime, and Criminal Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 31, 31-
56 (Michael H. Tonry ed., Oxford University Press 1998).
173. Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 161, at 1003. This possibility suggests
the extent to which Critical Race Theory explanations of social injustice are not
confined to academic thought.
174. Id. at 999-1000.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 999.
177. See generally Steven F. Cohn, Steven E. Barkan & William E. Haltman,
Punitive Attitudes Toward Criminals: Race Consensus or Racial Conflict? 38
Soc. PROBS. 287, 287-88 (1991).
178. Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 161, at 997-98.
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The difference in views on the causes of crime and justification
for punishment are thus seen as critical support for punitive action.
Peffley and Hurwitz suggest that this explains why white support
for capital punishment actually increased in their study when
whites were confronted with the consideration that the death
penalty is applied in a racially discriminatory fashion against
African Americans, a finding they characterized as the "most
startling" in their study.179 They conclude:
Because whites tend to fall heavily toward the dispositional
end of the black causes of crime scale, it is no small wonder
that when such views are activated [as when questioned about
whether their support for the death penalty would be changed
if shown that it is racially biased against blacks], whites are
collectively highly resistant to the argument that the death
penalty is racially unfair. Many whites begin with the belief
that the reason blacks are punished is because they deserve it,
not because the system is racially biased against them. So,
when these whites are confronted with an argument against
the death penalty that is based on race, they reject those
arguments with such force that they end up expressing more
support for the death penalty than when no argument is
presented at all.180
The implications for the goal of a racially equitable
administration of the death penalty are significant. If attitudes
toward black crime vary dramatically between whites and African
Americans, with whites tending to believe that black crime is
primarily the product of internal, dispositional factors-
predisposing African Americans to commit crime-then one must
assume that these attitudes will weigh heavily in the capital
sentencing process. Even within the black community, Peffley and
Hurwitz conclude that support for the death penalty varies based on
overall perception of the causes of black crime and attitudes toward
punishment. 81 The predisposition of black jurors serving in capital
cases with respect to the causes of crime committed by African
Americans is likely to be an important factor in whether, in a given
case, a capital jury will impose the death penalty.
Within the death-penalty context, the significance of the range
of responses for support of criminalization and punishment cannot
be underestimated. Thus, if whites do tend to view the sources of
black crime as internal, or dispositional, they may be predisposed to
favor imposition of the death penalty in cases involving black
defendants, whereas a belief that crime is the product of external
179. Id. at 1006.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1004-05.
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factors might well militate in favor of mitigation and imposition of a
life sentence.
Consider the most critical issue in the Texas capital sentencing
decision, the interrogatory regarding the probability that the
convicted defendant will commit acts of criminal violence in the
future. Both white and black jurors tending to view criminality as
the product of internal, dispositional, factors would likely be
predisposed to believe that the defendant will continue to be a
threat to society, even within the penitentiary. Because this view
predominates among white respondents in the Peffley and Hurwitz
study,182 their conclusions suggest that the likelihood of racial
attitudes influencing actual jury deliberations in Texas capital trials
is substantial, undermining the integrity of the death penalty
imposed, even if reviewing courts and most observers would likely
conclude that a death sentence could be appropriately imposed
based on the evidence of the capital offense and the defendant's
character, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.
While this is likely the type of social-science research that the
Supreme Court would find unpersuasive in fashioning capital
sentencing rules, 183 these conclusions should certainly trouble the
Court and legislators concerned about erosion of faith in the
criminal justice system. More troubling should be the probability
that many death sentences are tainted by predisposition of white
jurors to impose death on black defendants based on stereotypical
views about disposition of African Americans to commit criminal
acts and, particularly, acts of criminal violence.
B. Death Qualification and Disparity in Attitudes Toward the
Death Penalty
Even more critical than the disparity in support for the death
penalty among white and black Americans is the potential impact of
their opposition to capital punishment. The Gallup Organization
reports that more than twice as many African Americans, 49%, are
opposed to capital punishment, than whites, 24%.184 This disparity
creates a structural tension in the operation of the capital jury
selection process that eventually compromises the integrity of the
system of imposing the death penalty and threatens a virtually
inherent discriminatory impact in its application.
The reason lies in the fact that Witherspoon serves as a basis for
exclusion of absolute opponents of capital punishment, which,
182. Id. at 1006 & fig.1.
183. See supra notes 9-10 for discussion of McCleskey v. Kemp. There, the
Court rejected social-science data as unpersuasive with regard to systemic
racial discrimination in capital punishment. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 294-97 (1987).
184. See Carroll, supra note 144.
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according to the survey data, almost certainly results in a smaller
percentage of black citizens being excluded from service on capital
juries than whites. 8 5
The Lockhart majority noted that prior jury composition cases
had focused not on juror's beliefs, but on demographic
characteristics, such as African Americans, women, and Mexican
Americans, 186 recognizing a distinct difference in demographics and
juror beliefs in exclusion of prospective jurors from service:
Because these groups were excluded for reasons completely
unrelated to the ability of members of the group to serve as
jurors in a particular case, the exclusion raised at least the
possibility that the composition of juries would be arbitrarily
skewed in such a way as to deny criminal defendants the
benefit of the common sense judgment of the community. 1
87
The majority then observed:
The group of "Witherspoon -excludables" involved in the case
at bar differs significantly from the groups we have previously
recognized as "distinctive." "Death qualification," unlike the
wholesale exclusion of blacks, women, or Mexican Americans
from jury service, is carefully designed to serve the State's
concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that
can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the
case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial.
There is very little danger, therefore, and McCree does not
even argue, that "death qualification" was instituted as a
means for the State to arbitrarily skew the composition of
capital case juries. 188
The Lockhart majority rejected McCree's attempt to equate
exclusion based on ethnicity or gender with exclusion based on juror
attitudes 89. Justice Rehnquist responded to the argument by
explaining that the attitude of any prospective juror to the death
penalty is a matter of individual choice:
185. See id.
186. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986).
187. Id.




[U]nlike blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans,
"Witherspoon -excludables" are singled out for exclusion in
capital cases on the basis of an attribute that is within the
individual's control. It is important to remember that not all
who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause
in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death
penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital
cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to
temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule
of law. Because the group of "Witherspoon -excludables"
includes only those who cannot and will not conscientiously
obey the law with respect to one of the issues in a capital case,
"death qualification" hardly can be said to create an
"appearance of unfairness."19 0
The effect of death qualification of capital jurors on the racial
composition of capital juries had been noted even before Lockhart.191
Following Lockhart, Professor Thomas Schornhorst observed:
190. Id. at 176.
191. See e.g., Bruce J. Winnick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge
Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982). Professor Winnick, in evaluating the competing
constitutional goals of death qualification and protection against racially based
exclusion of prospective jurors, observed: "The studies of demographic
characteristics found that exclusion of capital punishment objectors results in
the disproportionate exclusion of blacks and women." Id. (citing Hovey v.
Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1337-39 (Cal. 1980)).
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The state's ability to stack the jury against the accused
through the death qualification process is even greater than
the majority in [Lockhart] was willing to acknowledge. For
example, in Indiana each side is accorded twenty peremptory
challenges in a death penalty case, as opposed to ten in a non-
capital case. The prosecutor will challenge peremptorily
prospective jurors whose doubts about the death penalty are
not sufficiently strong to justify exclusion by way of the
Witherspoon/Witt criteria, thereby increasing the jury's tilt
toward the state. Since the percentage of persons disfavoring
capital punishment is decreasing, and the remaining "scrupled"
population is likely to include, proportionately, more women,
blacks, hispanics [sic] and economically underprivileged
persons, the state will not only be able to exclude most of the
"soft" jurors, but also to distort the representativeness of the
jury. The defendant, on the other hand, is likely soon to run
out of his or her equal number of peremptory challenges if the
defendant exercises them to exclude people who favor the
death penalty. The defendant will, in the end, be able to
exclude only the most avid capital punishment devotees. 192
This analysis is borne out by the studies of capital punishment
in the decades since Lockhart that show significantly greater
opposition to the death penalty among African Americans than
whites. 193 Not only do smaller percentages of black jurors fit the
death-qualification model imposed by Witherspoon, reducing the
overall percentage of African Americans likely to serve on a capital
jury by more than the pre-death-qualified demographic statistics
would show, but those black jurors expressing reservations about
capital punishment are subject to exclusion through peremptory
strikes. 194 Those reservations become race-neutral explanations for
strikes, further reducing the available pool of black jurors likely to
actually serve on capital juries.
195
These concerns prompted the trial court in the Eastern District
of Massachusetts to order the selection and seating of two juries for
guilt/innocence and punishment phases of a federal capital trial in
United States v. Green.196 Because of the demographic character of
the district, a smaller percentage of prospective jurors who were
African American would be expected to be called for service.
197
Taking into consideration polling data showing that a substantially
192. F. Thomas Schornhorst, Preliminary Screening of Prosecutorial Access
to Death Qualified Juries: A Missing Constitutional Link, 62 IND. L.J. 295, 322-
23 (1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. See infra Subpart IV.C.
195. Schornhorst, supra note 192, at 323 (noting the likelihood that death
disqualification will "blunt" the effect of Batson).
196. 343 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 2004), rev'd, 407 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2005).
197. Id. at 26.
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larger number of African Americans than whites oppose capital
punishment and thus, would be subject to exclusion under
Witherspoon, the court observed: "Death-qualifying a jury could
significantly deplete the already paltry number of minority jurors in
the Eastern District."198 The court consequently concluded:
These two factors-the large percentage of African-Americans
who are opposed to the death penalty and the
disproportionately small number of African-Americans in the
Eastern District of Massachusetts jury venire-de facto
exclude all or most African-Americans from a death-qualified
jury. 199
Thus, the court ordered that two juries would be empanelled,
one of which would serve only in the event the case proceeded to a
capital sentencing hearing.200 However, the government petitioned
the First Circuit for a writ of mandamus to reverse the trial court's
order.201  The circuit court found the trial court's action
"unprecedented" and contrary to the provisions 202 of the Federal
Death Penalty Act. 20 3 The trial court had held that the defendants
had no right to a non-death-qualified capital jury.204 Rejecting the
argument that death-qualification would unconstitutionally
compromise the possibility of seating a jury fairly reflecting the
black population in the district, the circuit court issued an advisory
mandamus 205 directing the district court to vacate its two-jury
198. Id. at 33. The court also considered other factors reducing black
participation in jury service in the district, including the fact that income
factors influenced jury participation, reducing responses to jury summonses
among minority and economically disadvantaged citizens. See id.
199. Id. at 33-34. The court also noted that its conclusions had been
demonstrated in prior trials in the Eastern District of Massachusetts in United
States v. Gilbert and United States v. Sampson, both trials in which no black
jurors were seated where significant numbers of the relatively small number of
black venirepersons opposed the death penalty. See id. at 33-34, 34 n.17
(citations omitted).
200. Id. at 35.
201. Green, 407 F.3d 434.
202. Id. at 439.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2002).
204. Green, 407 F.3d at 436 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 439. The court explained the nature of the "advisory mandamus,"
as opposed to the more common form of the writ:
The second type of mandamus-known as advisory mandamus-is
more apt in the circumstances at hand. Mandamus, in any form, is an
extraordinary remedy, but advisory mandamus is available only in a
tiny subset of cases. Such cases are those that present novel
questions of great significance which, if not immediately addressed,
are likely to recur and to evade effective review. The aim of advisory
mandamus, then, is to settle substantial questions of law in
circumstances that "would assist other jurists, parties, [and] lawyers."
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order.206 Although the court noted the trial court's reasoning in
issuing its two jury order, it never addressed the constitutional
conflict raised by the competing demands of death qualification and
seating of a jury not unfairly distorted demographically to the
potential detriment of the accused. 207 Instead, it focused solely on
the statutory provisions governing the seating of the jury in a
federal death-penalty trial, finding that the district court did not
have authority to alter the capital sentencing process dictated by the
statute.208 In short, the circuit court observed: "The bottom line is
this: where Congress has provided a specific panoply of rules that
must be followed, the district court's discretionary powers simply do
not come into play."209
Green may be procedurally correct and consistent with both the
Court's decisions in Witherspoon and Witt and Congressional intent
in the Federal Death Penalty Act, but the constitutional conflict
underlying the district court's concern remains unaddressed and
unanswered: at what point does the death-qualification process
result in an enforced racial imbalance in the administration of the
death penalty, regardless of the lack of discriminatory intent?
The interplay between "death qualification" under
Witherspoon/Witt and the compelling research demonstrating the
greater extent of black opposition to capital punishment than white
opposition, creates the kind of systemic flaw in the administration of
the death penalty that warrants serious consideration of abolition
for multiple reasons.
First, capital punishment necessarily fails as a constitutionally
acceptable sentencing option if it simply serves as an instrument of
oppression. 210 Whether supporters intend this purpose for the death
penalty is actually, in a sense, of little consequence if substantial
opinion concludes that it is an instrument of oppression. Only by
maintaining credibility as a reasoned response to the most heinous
of homicides does it fulfill a constitutionally accepted option for
To obtain relief under this species of mandamus, the petitioner does
not need to show irreparable harm.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 770 (1994)).
A significant portion of the circuit court's opinion addressed its own jurisdiction
to consider the issue raised by the government in seeking review of the district
court's two-jury order. See id. at 438-40.
206. Id. at 444.
207. Id. at 437.
208. Id. at 440-44.
209. Id. at 443.
210. See e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 440-42 (2008); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 123, 182-83, 183 n.28 (1976) (recognizing primary penological




retribution.211 Similarly, if the punishment is not rationally
responsive, but actually employed for purposes of oppression, it
lacks credible deterrent value because those offenders for whom
deterrence is intended will not view the punishment as an
appropriate response at all. Instead, as an instrument of
oppression, its lack of credibility may, in fact, prompt irrational or
excessively brutal homicidal acts among offenders intent on
retaliating for perceived oppression in the use of death sentences.
Second, if there is substantial belief within any segment of the
population that capital punishment is serving as an instrument of
oppression, it will lack credibility within that population. This is
apparently now the case with respect to a substantial segment of the
black community, leading to opposition to the use of the death
penalty. 212 Once those opponents are officially subject to exclusion
from service on capital juries, the perception that the punishment is
oppressive will be reinforced by experience.
Arguably, what is significant is the need for opponents of capital
punishment to still view the penalty as fairly administered, thus
offering no empirical support to their conscientious objections.
When the death penalty is applied inaccurately, resulting in
exoneration of death row inmates, or in a racially discriminatory
fashion, the perception that the death penalty is applied improperly
and as an instrument of oppression does provide opponents with
empirical support for their position.
In Witherspoon, the Court noted that the capital jury's
fundamental duty is to "express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death."213 The constitutional conflict
suggested by the significantly greater opposition of African
Americans than whites to the use of the death penalty means that
while death qualification may be constitutionally sound as a means
of administering the penalty in accord with legislative
determination that capital punishment is a valid exercise of the
State's authority to punish murder, it fails in another important
sense. It necessarily threatens to skew the composition of the jury
empanelled to express community conscience along racial lines. In
so doing, it exacerbates the separation of the black and white
populations within the community so that the death penalty itself
211. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 411.
212. JAMES D. UNNEVER & SHAUN L. GABBIDON, A THEORY OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN OFFENDING: RACE, RACISM, AND CRIME 34 (2011) (citing Devon
Johnson, Anger About Crime and Support for Punitive Criminal Justice
Policies, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOc'Y 51 (2009) ("[B]lacks are unwilling to embrace
the death penalty.., because they believe these severe policies will unfairly
target other African Americans.")).
213. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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becomes an expression of the moral judgment of largely only the
white community.
2 14
C. Witherspoon and Batson in the Capital Jury Selection Process
Both Witherspoon and significant post-Batson decisions
addressing exclusion of minority jurors have arisen in the context of
capital prosecutions and continue to impact the process for selection
of capital juries. 215 The interplay between the capital sentencing
process and exclusion of minority jurors from capital juries is
important because it raises the question of fairness of the process in
light of the disparity in majority and minority views regarding
support for use of the death penalty. The Witherspoon death-
qualification test thus results in an unintended impediment for
214. In commenting on statistical research focusing on administration of the
death penalty in Philadelphia, Professor Samuel R. Gross observed:
Professor Baldus and his colleagues also examined the effect of the
racial composition of the juries on the outcomes of these capital cases.
They found that juries with more black members were considerably
less likely to impose the death penalty than juries with fewer black
members, particularly when the defendant was black. This finding is
especially striking because it is based on the decisions of those jurors
who survived-peremptory challenges. And it was a severe winnowing.
A majority of all black venire members in the Baldus sample were
excused by the prosecution, and a majority of all white venire
members were excused by the defense. It is safe to assume that each
side focused its fire-as best it could-on those potential jurors who
were most likely to favor the opposition. That means the prosecutors
removed the most predictably anti-death penalty blacks, and the
defense attorneys got rid of the most clearly pro-death penalty whites.
As a result, the black jurors who actually sat on these cases are likely
to have been uncommonly similar to the remaining whites in their
willingness to vote for death, and the whites who sat are likely to have
been closer in that respect to the remaining blacks. The differences
that Baldus et al. found were those remaining after the leveling effect
of jury selection itself.
In other words, capital prosecutors and defense lawyers in
Philadelphia know what they are doing. Race really is a powerful
predictor of capital sentencing, especially in black-defendant cases,
and it may also (as many attorneys believe) predict jurors'
predispositions on guilt as well.
Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 283, 292-93 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
215. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 474, 476 (2008) (Batson
violation question in death-penalty case); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 236
(2005) (applying Batson to a claim of discriminatory jury selection in a pre-
Batson capital trial); Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562, 567 (1992) (holding that a
pre-Batson claim of discrimination in the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges properly preserved a capital defendant's equal protection argument);
Esquivel v. McCotter, 795 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding Batson only




promoting the goal of fairly representative capital juries selected to
serve without regard to race or ethnicity.
1. The Witherspoon Effect
The inherent tension between enforcement of the Witherspoon
requirement that jurors be able to consider the full range of
punishments authorized in capital cases, including the death
penalty, and the goal of fair representation of ethnic minorities in
juries, compromises the likelihood that capital juries will include
proportionate representation of minority jurors. In the individual
case, any number of factors could produce juries reflecting the
relative support or opposition to capital punishment toward a jury
strongly supporting the death penalty, including purely random
selection of jurors drawn to serve on any particular day. But, as a
general matter, the importance of Witherspoon death qualification is
that it necessarily reduces the potential pool of otherwise eligible
jurors whose opposition to capital punishment renders them subject
to disqualification. Because opposition runs higher in the black
community than the white community, this generally means that
the overall proportion of citizens serving as capital jurors will
almost certainly not reflect population demographics in death-
penalty jurisdictions having the largest percentages of minority
citizens. 216
Exclusion of jurors who are not qualified to serve under
Witherspoon does not demonstrate a violation of the Batson
principle even though the excluded non-qualifying jurors are
members of a cognizable racial or ethnic group, such as African
Americans. Courts confronted with arguments that the exclusion of
Witherspoon-disqualified prospective jurors is impermissible
because it results in exclusion of minority jurors have rejected the
argument that Witherspoon disqualification violates Batson in
reducing minority representation on capital juries because the basis
for the exclusion is not racial or ethnic bias, but inability of the juror
to apply the law providing for capital punishment.217
216. The Mississippi Supreme Court noted the argument made by defense
counsel in this respect in challenging the exclusion of black jurors based on
Witherspoon as resulting in an equal protection violation in Pitchford v. State,
45 So. 3d 216, 228 (Miss. 2010), holding that the exclusion was proper because
the focus of the trial court's action was in opposition to the death penalty
precluding the prospective jurors from serving.
217. See, e.g., Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d 18, 28-29 (Miss. 1998) ("The
challenges for cause are to be examined under the Witherspoon cases and
peremptory challenges are to be examined under Batson. If each of the
challenges is found to be constitutionally sound, then the combination is also
sound. A successful Witherspoon challenge against a black juror is not relevant,
because'. . . a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in
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2. Batson and Capital Jury Composition
A second factor in the capital selection process threatens
exclusion of black jurors in capital juries. Because the voir dire
process in a capital case typically focuses on support or opposition to
capital sentencing, skillful questioning by trial counsel will lead to
disclosure of the degree of support or opposition among individual
prospective jurors.218 Even though a juror may be Witherspoon
eligible, the voir dire examination may be carefully designed to
determine the extent to which the juror will hold the prosecution to
a higher burden in demonstrating that death is an appropriate
punishment based on the circumstances of the offense and the
character of the defendant.2 19  Although capital sentencing
procedures vary among jurisdictions, at a minimum a court's
framework for imposing death requires the sentencing authority to
make determinations regarding aggravating circumstances that
may warrant a death sentence and a process for balancing the
prosecution's proof of aggravation against mitigating circumstances
that may be developed by the defense in the case. 22 0 In some
jurisdictions this process requires jurors to weigh aggravating
circumstances against mitigating circumstances;221 in others, jurors
will respond to special issues that require consideration of these
factors in assessing the punishment. 22
2
part of persons of his own race."' (quoting Pinkney v. State, 538 So. 2d 329, 346-
47 (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted))).
218. See, e.g., Death Penalty-Voir Dire Disqualification, 99 HARv. L. REV.
120, 129 (1985) (discussing the bounds of voir dire in determining juror feelings
toward the death penalty).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (requiring
capital sentencing authority to have the discretion to consider mitigation
evidence offered in support of the imposition of a sentence less than death not
limited by statutory restrictions on mitigating circumstances).
221. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (West 2014) (setting out the process
for jury deliberations for the imposition of a death sentence in capital cases in
which the death penalty is sought: "The jury shall impose a sentence of death if
the jury unanimously returns written findings that: (1) An aggravating
circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Aggravating circumstances
outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist;
and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a
reasonable doubt.").
222. For instance, under the Texas capital sentencing procedure the jury is
initially required to decide "whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society .... ." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (West 2014).
The statute then provides that the trial court will then instruct the jury that in
deliberating on the issues submitted under subsection (b) of this article, it shall
consider all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the
punishment stage, including evidence of the defendant's background or
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The prosecutor interested in ensuring imposition of a death
sentence will likely be motivated to use the Witherspoon
qualification test for assessing which jurors who are qualified to
serve would also be most hesitant in imposing a death sentence.
Those jurors are prime subjects for the exercise of the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges. Because African Americans are less
supportive of capital sentencing than whites according to national
polling, it is reasonable to assume that even African Americans
supporting the death penalty may demonstrate greater hesitance in
its use than whites who support the penalty more strongly. This is
likely particularly true if the defendant is black, or a member of
another group traditionally suffering racial or ethnic discrimination
with whom black jurors might identify. If this assumption is
correct, even Witherspoon-qualified black venirepersons are more
likely to be susceptible to questioning that focuses on the degree of
commitment to capital sentencing. Once identified, those jurors can
be excluded through peremptory strikes with the overall goal being
selection of a more death-prone jury.
The interplay between Witherspoon and Batson in this context
arises when the defense accuses the prosecution of exercising
peremptory challenges to exclude minority jurors based upon their
attitudes toward the use of the death penalty. 223 Once the Batson
challenge to a peremptory strike of a prospective juror is made, the
proponent must respond with a race-neutral explanation for
removing the juror.224 A mere denial that race or ethnicity was
character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or mitigates
against the imposition of the death penalty.
Id. § 2(d)(1).
223. See, e.g., State v. Waring, 701 S.E.2d 615, 636 (N.C. 2010).
224. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). For an interesting
discussion of the process for testing the race-neutral explanation offered for the
exercise of a peremptory challenge against a black venireperson, see Atkins v.
Easterling, 648 F.3d 380, 386-87 (6th Cir. 2011). There, the prosecutor struck
Juror D, a black female, based on her responses on her juror questionnaire
form:
(1) she indicated on the juror questionnaire that she had a relative
who was charged with a crime or had been the subject of a criminal
investigation; (2) she indicated that she considers herself to be
politically slightly liberal; and (3) she indicated that, if she was a
lawyer in this case, she would want to know how a juror felt about
blacks and crime, their thoughts about blacks, and whether they had
ever been robbed by a black person.
Id. at 386 (citations omitted). The trial judge rejected the prosecutor's
argument that he struck Juror D based upon her self-characterization as
"slightly liberal," explaining on the record: "To be perfectly honest, this is not
the only case where you've excused the only black juror. It's more often that
you do that than not." Id. (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit then
explained:
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involved in the decision to strike is insufficient to comply with the
requirement for a neutral explanation for the strike.225 But a
prospective juror's expressed hesitance in imposing the death
penalty will typically be found to meet that requirement for a race-
neutral reason for the strike. 226  Nevertheless, consistent with
Batson, a trial judge could reject the prosecutor's explanation for the
strike on this basis, finding that it was a pretext for striking based
on the juror's race or ethnic background. 227 This would appear to be,
at best, an extreme exception to the general tendency to find that
this explanation is both race neutral and non-pretextual. For
instance, in State v. Waring,228 the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the argument that exclusion of black jurors had been pre-
textual where its examination of the record showed that the
excluded jurors had all expressed some degree of opposition to the
death penalty in comparison to responses given by white jurors. The
court reviewed the responses of three venirepersons, all of whom
testified that they could follow the law and vote to impose a death
sentence. 229 But one of the three had initially stated that she was
personally opposed to the death penalty and she was eventually
struck. 230 The case was interracial, with a black defendant charged
with the murder of a white victim. 231 The supreme court found that
the stricken juror's support for the death penalty then wavered,
while the two white jurors the defense cited in comparison were
affirmative in their support for the death penalty. 23 2 Three black
The trial judge conducted an individual voir dire with Juror D, in
which she stated that her half-brother was convicted of selling drugs
and that she believed that "race has a bearing on the outcome of a
trial, in that a white juror may convict a defendant just because he is
black."
Id. (citations omitted). Based on the trial court's reference to a history of
approving peremptory strikes of jurors having close relatives who had been
charged or convicted of crimes, the judge then permitted the prosecutor to use
the strike against Juror D, even though it resulted in the seating of a jury
having no black members. Id. at 386-87. Engaging in a comprehensive review
of the record and state court jurisprudence in assessing the sufficiency of
justifications as "race neutral" for purposes of Batson claims, the Sixth Circuit
deferred to the disposition of the accused's claims by the state courts and denied
relief in this non-capital trial in which Atkins was convicted of aggravated
robbery in a carjacking. See id. at 384, 392-94.
225. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) ("The Court
has squarely held, however, that affirmations of good faith in making individual
selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion.").
226. See, e.g., State v. Waring, 701 S.E.2d 615, 646 (N.C. 2010).
227. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79-80.
228. 701 S.E.2d 615, 646.






jurors had previously been excluded for cause, based upon their
expressions of unequivocal opposition. 233 The court concluded:
In light of the responses of the prospective jurors to the key
voir dire questions about their views on the death penalty, and
considering the absence of any pattern of discrimination in the
exercise of the State's peremptory challenges at the time the
prosecutor peremptorily challenged prospective juror Rogers,
we conclude that defendant failed to meet his burden of
establishing a prima facie case that the State's action was
motivated by race. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying this Batson challenge. 23 4
Juror Rogers's candid responses during voir dire reflect the
multiple dimensions of the death-qualification process because
support or opposition to capital punishment is often not a simple
matter of choice. Instead, the issues are not only matters of
intellectual or abstract quality, but are complicated when the
question of capital punishment is focused on the individual juror's
ability or willingness to participate in a capital sentencing
proceeding. And, even if so, the individual juror's sense of support
for the death penalty may be compromised by facts likely to be
developed in the individual case. A key factor noted by the North
Carolina court involves the race or ethnicity of the accused or the
victim, or both, or whether the victim might be a child or impaired
individual.
Moreover, as Peffley, Hurwitz, and others have observed, the
difference in philosophical views toward the causes of crime among
whites and African Americans surveyed may demonstrate that some
prospective jurors within either group may base their notions of the
suitability of capital sentencing on the peculiar circumstances of the
offense or the accused, or both.235 In this respect, support for capital
punishment as an abstract proposition, and may be affected by the
perception that the death penalty is less suitable for certain capital
murders. 236 The voir dire examination of individual jurors in the
death-qualification phase of a capital trial thus can provide counsel
greater insight into assessing which prospective jurors will prove
more favorable, at least as a preliminary concern, for either side.
Since venirepersons with fixed views opposing capital punishment
will have been excluded for cause under Witherspoon, the voir dire
process arguably, if not certainly, favors the prosecution in its
ability to anticipate jurors who would be least favorably disposed to
233. Id.
234. Id. at 639.
235. Peffley & Hurwitz, supra note 161, at 999; see also Douglas 0. Linder,
Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 901-02 (1996).
236. Id.
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the State's case and remove them through peremptory strikes. For
the defense, Witherspoon-qualified jurors whose views are less than
fully explored during the prosecution's voir dire are often the most
promising for defending against a death sentence, particularly when
there is strong mitigation evidence for the sentencing phase of the
capital trial.
The legitimacy of the prosecution's explanation for use of
peremptory challenges against minority jurors is bolstered when the
record demonstrates that strikes predicated on lukewarm support
for the death penalty were used to remove white and non-white
venirepersons alike. Unlike the situation before the Court in Snyder
v. Louisiana,237  where the disparity in questioning and
circumstances of the prospective jurors undermined the credibility of
the prosecutor's "race neutral" explanation for peremptorily striking
the black juror, use of peremptory challenges to exclude both
majority and minority jurors based on attitudes toward the death
penalty provides effective refutation for the claim that the strikes
are, in fact, predicated on race or ethnicity.
Of course, the truth may actually be far different. A prosecutor
could choose to use her peremptory challenges against minority
jurors based on cultural stereotyping, personal prejudice, or a
concern that a minority juror will be more reluctant to impose death
on a minority defendant despite a generally favorable attitude
toward capital sentencing. The same prosecutor could quite
logically also remove Witherspoon-qualified majority jurors who
express some reservation about the death penalty with the goal of
achieving a jury more favorable, at least from the prosecutor's
perspective, to imposing death. Because the third prong of the
Batson test-assessment of the credibility of the race-neutral
explanation propounded by the striking counsel-is committed to
the trial court's exercise of discretion, 238 there is little room for any
reviewing court to discount the explanation when it is supported by
evidence that shows both majority and minority jurors were
excluded based on less rigorous support for the death penalty.
239
237. 552 U.S. 472 (2008); see also supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
238. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 431 (1985) (presuming the trial
judge's finding correct regarding the qualification of a prospective juror to serve
under Witherspoon).
239. Sometimes, of course, even ardent proponents of capital punishment
are not themselves comfortable with personally being involved in imposing a
death sentence as jurors. This is more likely true for prospective jurors who
may generally support capital punishment, but who do not personally want the
responsibility for sitting on a jury that could impose a death sentence. See, e.g.,
Waring, 701 S.E.2d at 636-37 (N.C. 2010) (noting that juror Rogers vacillated
with respect to support for the death penalty generally, but expressed personal
hesitance to sit on a jury where imposition of a death sentence would be
involved); see also supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
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In Lizcano v. State,240 for instance, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals addressed this situation in light of the defendant's claim
that the prosecutor used juror attitudes toward capital punishment
as a pretext for striking black venirepersons. 241  The court
explained:
The primary reason asserted by the State for striking five of
the six black venire members at issue was that they were
among eight venire members who circled a specific answer to a
specific question on the jury questionnaire. The answer
indicated that, although they did not believe that the death
penalty ever ought to be invoked, as long as the law provides
for it they could assess it under the proper circumstances. A
venire member's responses to a written questionnaire can be
valid grounds for a peremptory challenge. Because the State
struck all eight venire members who shared the characteristic
of circling this answer, including three non-black venire
members, the appellant has not demonstrated that the State's
reason for striking those five black venire members was a
pretext for discrimination. 2
42
The stricken minority jurors were not disqualified under
Witherspoon; in fact, each had indicated that they could comply with
the law and impose a death sentence in a proper case. 243 The fact
that prosecutors consistently struck prospective jurors responding to
The Texas juror's oath struck down in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 40, 42
& n.1 (1980), had been designed to address this situation. Of course, the same
factor may complicate a prospective juror's ability to serve when the juror can
affirm support for the death penalty, but not as strongly because of hesitance to
serve on a capital jury personally. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 548
(Tenn. 1990). In Jones, the court reported the prosecutor's explanation for
striking an otherwise qualified venireman:
Of the three black jurors excused, he stated that prospective juror
William Green "gave us trouble" on several of his answers. He did not
favor the death penalty and while qualified under Wainwright v. Witt
he appeared hesitant on this issue. Green's position as an elder in the
Church of Christ might also compromise his role as a juror because,
the prosecutor believed, he would have to explain his decision if he
voted for death to his congregation under practices of the
denomination. Mr. Green also seemed to be reluctant to sit on the
jury for religious reasons and his answers were ambiguous on whether
his religious feelings were so strong they would affect his decision-
making.
Id.
240. No. AP-75879, 2010 WL 1817772 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 2010).
241. Id. at *4.
242. Id. Moreover, the court cited prior decisions where similar claims had
been rejected when prospective jurors had responded the same way to questions
propounded on pretrial jury questionnaires regarding support for capital
sentencing. Id. at *4 n.17.
243. Id. at *6.
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the question on the juror questionnaire without regard to race
supported the conclusion that there was no pretext in using these
responses as race-neutral explanations offered for peremptory
challenges used on the minority jurors.
3. Reconfiguring the Capital Jury Selection Process
Not only does the Witherspoon death-qualification test result in
an unintended impediment for promoting the goal of fairly
representative capital juries selected to serve without regard to race
or ethnicity. It also provides an acceptable source of race-neutral
explanation for reducing racial or ethnic representation on capital
juries. This occurs because courts typically uphold peremptory
challenges used to remove Witherspoon-eligible jurors whose support
for capital sentencing is, nevertheless, qualified or moderated by
other concerns, such as the ability of a prospective juror to
personally be involved in imposition of a death sentence as a
member of a capital jury.244 To the extent that these individuals
may tend to mirror demographic tendencies with respect to support
for capital punishment generally, the likelihood is that jurors who
could not constitutionally be excluded under Batson will be excluded
because of their views on the death penalty.
Alternatives to the present Witherspoon/Batson intersection
that tends to reduce minority presence on capital juries could
address the problem seemingly attributable to unintended
convergence of these two lines of Supreme Court authority. The
alternatives, however, suggest undesirable, unintended
consequences making the goal of achieving a more representative
jury for administration of the capital sentencing system quite
difficult.
a. Eliminating Death Qualification Under Witherspoon
Effective administration of the death penalty likely requires
some type of death qualification of prospective jurors. It is difficult
to reconcile Witherspoon with any system of capital jury selection in
which jurors who are irrevocably opposed to capital sentencing are
allowed to serve precisely because the inclusion of those jurors
would result in either the frustration of the prosecution's lawful goal
of securing capital sentencing for those murderers whose offenses
and character warrant the death penalty. In holding those jurors
qualified for service, the process would necessarily shift to the
prosecution's use of its peremptories to exclude abolitionist jurors,
instead of simply focusing on jurors qualified based on their abstract
support for capital sentencing but whose responses during jury
244. See, e.g., Waring, 701 S.E.2d at 636-37.
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selection reflect some personal hesitance at imposing a death
sentence.
At first blush, this might appear a valid way to address the
problem of death qualification by eliminating this aspect of the
process altogether. But, it might also lead to disparity in imposition
of death sentences based solely on random factors, such as the
number of abolitionist jurors who happen to be included on any
given jury panel. A single juror holding anti-capital-punishment
sentiments could effectively frustrate the process by voting against a
death sentence unambiguously warranted by the facts of the case,
meaning that sentencing decisions would be based on juror ideology
or convictions, rather than on evidence. Much the same thing will
happen if a juror unable to consider a sentence other than death is
empowered to vote based on personal belief, rather than the
evidence, even when mitigating evidence is particularly powerful.
The Court recognized this possibility in Morgan v. Illinois,245 when
it held that the capital defendant must be entitled to inquire about a
juror's potential "death only" views because:
A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in
every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions
require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already
formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely
irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the
requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant
may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains
such views. If even one such juror is empaneled and the death
sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the
sentence. 246
The rationale for the Court's decision in Morgan is consistent
with the exclusion of jurors who cannot consider death based on
personal beliefs or bias and are disqualified under Witherspoon.
Without death qualification, the capital sentencing process would be
virtually abolished with the possibility of irrational exceptions based
simply on random selection of jury panels including no
venirepersons opposed to capital punishment. Otherwise, a single
juror unequivocally opposed to the death penalty would always be
positioned to avoid the unanimous sentencing verdict typically
245. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
246. Id. at 729.
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required for imposition of a death sentence, resulting in mandatory
imposition of a life sentence in many jurisdictions.
247
Elimination of the automatic disqualification of jurors
unequivocally opposed to capital sentencing would almost certainly
effectively eviscerate capital sentencing as a viable punishment
option. It might not serve to address the problem of racial
discrimination in jury selection, moreover, as prosecutors concerned
about obtaining death sentences would logically be inclined to
consider African Americans more likely to oppose imposition of a
death sentence in any individual case based on the substantial
opposition to capital punishment as a general proposition within the
black community. In fact, given the deference accorded trial judges
in their evaluation of a prosecutor's explanation for peremptory
challenges, exclusion of black jurors might persist through the use of
subterfuge in race-neutral explanations given for strikes when
challenged under Batson. This tactic would reflect the logical
appreciation for statistical evidence affording a basis for
stereotyping black jurors in assuming that their statistically greater
likelihood for rejecting capital punishment would warrant strikes
against them.
Yet, even administration of a system truly free from racially
based jury selection resulting from elimination of Witherspoon death
qualification would still produce the very arbitrariness in the
imposition of death sentences that led a plurality to reject then-
existing capital sentencing schemes in Furman.248 Only a venire
overwhelmingly favoring capital punishment such that opponents
could readily be excluded from service through peremptory strikes
247. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(c) (West 2014); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. Art. 905.8 (2014); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)-(v) (West 2014),
construed in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003) (providing that the
inability of a capital sentencing jury to reach unanimous agreement requires
the imposition of a life sentence without parole); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 37.071(g) (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(E) (West 2014); State v.
Springer, 586 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ohio 1992) (holding the imposition of a life
sentence proper where the jury cannot unanimously agree on the death
sentence as consistent with intent of the statute that failed to address the issue
of a hung jury in a capital sentencing proceeding). But see OR. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 163.150(5) (West 2014) (providing that a mistrial ordered during a sentencing
proceeding requires the trial court, at the discretion of the State, to impose a
life sentence or impanel a new jury for a new sentencing proceeding); State v.
Martinez, 282 P.3d 409, 418 (Ariz. 2012) (noting that a hung jury at a first
capital sentencing proceeding did not bar resentencing).
248. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) ("The Court holds that
the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it
leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings.").
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would likely result in the actual imposition of a death sentence in
any given case, resulting in the "infrequent imposition of the death
penalty" Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion in Furman:
"I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed. 249 This position was echoed by Justice White in
joining the plurality: "I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the
statutes before us are now administered, the penalty is so
infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated
to be of substantial service to criminal justice. 250
Neither Justice Stewart nor Justice White took the abolitionist
position advanced by Justices Douglas, 251 Brennan,252  and
Marshall 253 in their separate opinions in Furman. Both would later
vote to uphold capital sentencing statutes.254
Abolition of the Witherspoon test for qualification of capital
jurors would aggravate the problem addressed by the Court in
Furman, the concern that the imposition of capital sentences at that
point in the nation's history was simply so infrequent as to be
arbitrary and, thus, serve no legitimate punishment interest.255
Subjecting capital defendants to a system for seating capital juries
in which only some juries would be constituted such that all jurors
could agree to impose a death sentence based on random selection of
the venire would necessarily result in many capital defendants
escaping death not based on the merits of the case. Instead, those
defendants would not suffer capital sentencing because their juries
included members whose philosophical, religious or other
convictions would cause them to refuse to impose death regardless of
the evidence presented by the prosecution. This "freakish"
circumstance, like that leading Justices Stewart and White to
concur in Furman, would address the question of minority
representation only by making capital sentencing more irrational
than the systems considered by the Furman Court.
249. Id. at 306, 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 310, 313 (White, J., concurring)
251. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 257, 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 315, 369-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
254. E.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 264 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Id. at 277 (White, J., concurring).
255. David Von Drehle, Report: Death Penalty Use and Support Is Dropping,
TIME (Dec. 21, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nationarticle
/0,8599,2039273,00.html (reporting the lessened use of the death penalty).
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b. Elimination of All Peremptory Challenges
An alternative option exists for addressing the potential for
racial or ethnically discriminatory exclusion of prospective jurors
justified by reference to their less-than-unqualified support for
capital punishment. That would be to eliminate peremptory
challenges altogether, as Justice Marshall argued in his concurring
opinion in Batson: 'The decision today will not end the racial
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating
peremptory challenges entirely."
256
In the long term, resolution of the problems posed by
discriminatory practice in the use of peremptory challenges almost
certainly requires reconsideration of the role played by exclusion of
jurors based on subjective perceptions of counsel with respect to the
predisposition of venirepersons. As Justice Marshall explained in
his Wilkinson v. Texas257 dissent from denial of certiorari, the
critical flaw in Batson's rationale can be found in its simplification of
the problem of racism. Even those prosecutors conscientiously
attempting to avoid the effects of racial discrimination may fail to
appreciate biases, predisposition, or stereotyping that may be traced
to life experience or other influences in which racial animosity has
been a motivating factor. This subtle racism may lead to honestly
held assumptions that the effects of discriminatory attitudes have
been purged from current thinking.258 Conversely, Batson permits
those prosecutors who intend to discriminate to do so by simply
relying on racially neutral explanations for their peremptory strikes,
willingly engaging in deceit to exclude minorities from participation
in the criminal process as jurors. The problem with Batson is, then,
that it rests on the notion that prosecutors, who, bound by an oath
to uphold the Constitution, will obey the law. The decision itself
proves that this is simply not the case. 259 Justice Marshall again
urged elimination of all peremptory challenges echoing his position
in his concurring opinion in Batson.
260
However, elimination of all peremptory challenges would
necessarily deprive capital defendants of any opportunity to exclude
prospective jurors whose apparent bias against the accused--on any
basis, not just race or ethnic prejudice-would not be sufficiently
apparent to require the trial court to exclude an unfavorable juror
for cause. But, because the Batson rationale is founded on the
256. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
257. 493 U.S. 924, 928 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra note 76 and
accompanying text (providing Justice Marshall's observation).
258. See Linder, supra note 235, at 900-02.
259. See Wilkinson, 493 U.S. at 928 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
260. 476 U.S. at 101, 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
11592014]
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection of the rights of citizens to
serve on juries, as well as a party's right to a jury selected on
constitutionally acceptable grounds, traceable to Strauder, and
earlier decisions in Neal v. Delaware261 and Virginia v. Rives, 262
there is good reason for expansion of Batson beyond a right
recognized only for criminal defendants. 263  Thus, because the
protection of the rights of prospective jurors is integral to the Batson
rationale, discriminatory exclusion of jurors based on race or
ethnicity is precluded in civil litigation in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Company.264
c. Elimination of the Prosecution's Peremptory Challenges
In order to harmonize Justice Marshall's preference for
exclusion of peremptory challenges as the only effective means of
countering discrimination in jury selection and the tactical need for
capital defendants to have a meaningful remedy for countering
perceived juror bias not requiring disqualification for cause, the
rationale for affording defendants a right to peremptory exclusion in
criminal, and particularly capital, trials must rest on a theory other
than equal protection. Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Georgia v.
McCollum, 265 recognized the purpose of Batson in promoting
nondiscriminatory justice when the majority held that the Batson
prohibition would also apply the exercise of peremptories by
criminal defendants.266 She argued that criminal defense counsel
should not be counted as state actors267 in applying the equal
protection analysis earlier advanced in Edmonson.268  Justice
O'Connor described the application of the state actor
characterization to include criminal defendants and their counsel as"remarkable,"269 while Justice Scalia, also dissenting, used stronger
language, calling the majority's reliance on the state actor analysis
applied in Edmonson "terminally absurd."270
One answer could be to conclude, as Justice Marshall suggested,
that protection against equal protection violations of rights of
261. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
262. 103 U.S. 313 (1880).
263. Batson, 476 U.S. at 104-05 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
264. 500 U.S. 614, 628-31 (1991). Similarly, discrimination based on gender
in the exercise of peremptory challenges was prohibited in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
265. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
266. Id. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 67-68.
268. 500 U.S. at 620-21, 627.
269. 505 U.S. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 69-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A criminal defendant, in the
process of defending himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of
the state.").
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prospective jurors cannot be effectively guaranteed by the tools
adopted in Batson or other trial procedures, requiring elimination of
peremptory challenges as a generally accepted litigation option for
all litigants.271  However, the Court's holding in Holland v.
Illinois,272 that peremptory challenges in criminal trials are
controlled by Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
considerations, rather than Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantees,
should be overruled.27 3 Because criminal defendants enjoyed the
right to use peremptory challenges at the common law, 274 the Court
could quite reasonably conclude that criminal defendants must be
permitted use of peremptory challenges as a component of the Sixth
Amendment fair jury trial guarantee. 275 Changing constitutional
doctrine is typically not so simple, of course, and elimination of all
peremptory strikes would seem to impair the rights of some civil
litigants to fair trials unless nonunanimous verdict rules in civil
actions would effectively reduce the chance that predisposed jurors
not subject to exclusion for cause would be able to compromise the
integrity of the jury's decision making by masking bias during the
selection process.
An alternative option would simply require a reassessment of
the underlying rationale for use of peremptories in terms of strict
reference to state actors. As a matter of Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection analysis, civil litigants could be precluded from
using peremptory strikes to exclude prospective jurors on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or gender. The right of criminal defendants to
exclude jurors as a matter of the Sixth Amendment fair jury trial
right could remain intact and counsel might still be required to
explain their strikes as warranted by race-neutral explanations.
Yet, the State could simply be denied the option of peremptorily
striking any otherwise qualified prospective juror on the ground
that even race-neutral reasons for the strike would not support this
exercise of state action against the individual citizen called for jury
service.
An even broader reading of the Sixth Amendment right
affording fair trials to criminal defendants could rest on the
dissenting opinions of Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Georgia v.
McCollum, permitting defendants to exercise peremptory strikes on
any basis, including race, ethnicity or gender, because defendants
are not state actors, barred from discriminatory action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
271. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
272. 493 U.S. 494 (1990).
273. Id. at at 498.
274. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-21 (1965).
275. See, e.g., id. (noting the importance of peremptory challenges).
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Elimination of peremptory challenges in the jury selection
process would not impair any explicit constitutional value. The
Swain Court itself detailed the continued reliance on peremptory
strikes not as an element of constitutional protection, but as a
matter of English common law tradition.2 76
Yet, the elimination of peremptory strikes from the capital jury
selection process would have another consequence in that it would
deprive the defense of an opportunity to remove jurors perceived by
the accused and counsel to be hostile or predisposed to convict or
impose death who otherwise survived challenges for cause. In
Morgan v. Illinois,277 for instance, the Court recognized that the
capital defendant should be afforded the opportunity to question
prospective capital jurors qualified to serve based on their support
for capital punishment concerning their commitment to imposing
death sentences. A capital juror who believes that all murders, or
murders defined as capital under the controlling law, should be
punished by death-whether grounded in the Biblical "eye for an
eye" principle or other reasons-will almost certainly be unable to
give deference to mitigating circumstances supported by the
evidence and, thus, will be unable to follow the law in much the
same way that abolitionists or opponents of capital sentencing
cannot follow the law and are subject to disqualification under
Witherspoon.
Some jurors who hold views strongly supporting capital
punishment may, however, still affirm their ability or duty to follow
the law and be found qualified to serve under Morgan.278 Without
recourse to exclusion of such jurors through peremptories, capital
defendants may be forced to present their mitigation evidence to a
juror who is predisposed, but not unalterably so, to not considering
life imprisonment or some lesser punishment as an appropriate
sentence in the case. One can argue, of course, that this simply
equalizes the selection process for the prosecution and defense since
prosecutors would no longer be able to peremptorily remove
Witherspoon-qualified jurors who express hesitance in their
willingness to actually impose a death sentence or appear lukewarm
in their support for the death penalty.
The peremptory strike may, consequently, afford the criminal
defendant facing a death sentence the opportunity to negate
deliberate misrepresentation by a prospective juror in denying a
predisposition to impose death in every murder case, or to reject
mitigation without having heard the defense case in the punishment
phase of the capital trial. It also, frankly, affords the defense the
276. Id. at 211-22.
277. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
278. Id. at 735.
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option of excluding the lying venireperson whose denial of
prejudgment-bias based on the nature of the case-or animus
toward the accused as a member of a particular ethnic, social or
cultural group is otherwise credited by the trial judge in rejecting a
challenge made by the defense for cause.
Thus, the more sinister consequence of removing the accused's
right to use peremptories in capital cases likely lies in the fact that
the remedy provided in Turner v. Murray will effectively be
compromised by the inability to use the voir dire process to tease
indications of racial animus or bias from prospective jurors in the
questioning process. Jurors are often unlikely to admit the
existence of bias in their lives279 for any number of reasons,
including an honest desire to believe that they would not
discriminate based on race or ethnicity. Skillful examination during
voir dire may disclose indications of latent or suppressed racist
tendencies that could result in a greater likelihood that in a cross-
racial crime, or where the accused is a member of a minority group,
those jurors would be more inclined to impose death. Similarly, the
accused, personally, may discern evidence of animus or bias based
on personal experience through facial interaction or gestures
counseling in favor of exclusion through peremptory challenges.
28 0
279. See supra note 62 (regarding trial counsel's explanation for not
inquiring about racial bias in voir dire based on experience that jurors do not
answer truthfully). The Fifth Circuit accepted counsel's explanation. Sterling
v. Cockrell, 100 F. App'x 239, 332 (5th Cir. 2004). Similarly, the Florida
Supreme Court addressed a similar ineffective assistance challenge in the light
of trial counsel's personal experience that supported his explanation for not
questioning prospective jurors on the subject of racial bias:
The record reveals that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to
ask each prospective juror specific race-based questions. Trial counsel
testified during the postconviction proceeding that he does not
automatically ask race-related questions in interracial crimes, and
that his decision to do so turns on the composition of the prospective
panels and the facts of the case involved. Counsel further asserted
that he did not regard Fennie's case as racially motivated, and that he
wanted to avoid offending or alienating potential jurors by asking
each of them questions related to race. In trial counsel's experience,
the risk of jury alienation would not have been cured through the use
of individual voir dire.
Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 603 (Fla. 2003).
280. The Swain Court noted the use of peremptory challenges in assessing
potential bias of prospective jurors in this respect, generally:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory
satisfies the rule that "to perform its high function in the best way
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Indeed the very
availability of peremptories allows counsel to ascertain the possibility
of bias through probing questions on the voir dire and facilitates the
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Even when the prospective jurors do not indicate any tendency
toward racial discrimination in their personal lives, peremptory
challenges serve a significant function for the defense, particularly
in a capital trial. For instance, a prospective juror who has personal
experience in law enforcement, or relatives or close friends with law
enforcement experience, will almost never be viewed as a favorable
juror in a criminal trial. The reasons are rather obvious-not only
will the venireperson be more inclined to identify with law
enforcement in the case, but he or she will also likely tend to be
favorable to testimony or evidence offered through other law
enforcement officers. If the juror affirms neutrality, however, the
trial judge may seize on this affirmation in holding the juror
qualified to serve, perhaps being reluctant to appear too inclined to
disqualify law enforcement officers from jury service. The trial
judge can typically err on the side of inclusion, recognizing that
defense counsel can remove the juror through use of a peremptory
strike without fear of antagonizing the law enforcement community
beyond that which might reasonably be expected in a system which
is admittedly adversarial.
The State, as opposed to the defense, has no valid interest in
excluding jurors qualified for service on capital trials who are not
subject to challenge.281 Exclusion of prospective jurors otherwise
qualified to serve-even when based on race or gender neutral
grounds-necessarily results in some form of exclusion that is
subjective and reflects stereotyping of the juror or their attitudes
that really cannot be justified as a constitutionally sound exercise of
the sovereign's authority. To the extent that jury service does
exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a
juror's hostility through examination and challenge for cause.
380 U.S. at 219-220 (quoting In re Murchison, 340 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
Murchison dealt with the authority of Michigan trial judges to conduct
contempt proceedings and did not address the role of peremptory strikes at all.
See Murchison, 340 U.S. at 136.
281. The Swain majority argued that according peremptory challenges to
the prosecution was necessary to prevent prejudice to the prosecution. 380 U.S.
at 220 (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 128 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). In Hayes, the Court
affirmed the right for the prosecution not to be disadvantaged in trial
procedure, specifically addressing peremptory strikes:
Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the
jurybox from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory
challenge. The public prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to
distrust the character of a juror offered, from his habits and
associations, and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal
objection to him. In such cases, the peremptory challenge is a
protection against his being accepted. The number of such challenges
must necessarily depend upon the discretion of the legislature, and
may vary according to the condition of different communities, and the
difficulties in them of securing intelligent and impartial jurors.
128 U.S. at 70.
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reflect a component of the citizenship experience, the prosecution
has no greater claim to exclusion of qualified jurors from service
than it would have for exclusion of qualified electors from voting. If
this position is sound, or arguably sound, then the elimination of
prosecutorial peremptory strikes in capital cases by the Court,
through the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, would
clearly be appropriate. After all, peremptory challenges are not
protected under the Constitution and the Court, while recognizing
their place in the tradition of litigation, has, nevertheless, restricted
their use in Batson and its progeny.
28 2
There is an additional problem in the impact of death
qualification on ethnic diversity in capital juries. Substantial
scholarly literature supports the commonly held perception of
defense lawyers that jurors qualified for service on capital juries
based on their unequivocal approval of capital punishment are also
more likely to convict, or to be "conviction prone."28 3 The Court itself
recognized this body of literature in Lockhart v. McCree,28 4 where
the majority rejected the argument in holding that due process was
not offended by the refusal to empanel separate juries for the
guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of capital trials.28 5 The
Lockhart Court noted that studies finding the same predisposition of
jurors qualified for service in capital cases were before the Court in
Witherspoon, and were found to be insufficient to warrant a
definitive conclusion on the claims made in opposition to the use of
death qualification in selecting a jury that would also be charged
282. See supra note 71 (discussing the expansion of the Batson principle in
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (applying Batson when a criminal
defendant is not ethnic minority)). See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127 (1994) (extending Batson to bar the use of peremptory challenges based on
the a juror's gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending
Batson to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges in criminal trials);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson to
civil litigation).
283. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-70 nn.4-5 (1986).
284. Id.
285. The majority cited the Witherspoon Court's characterization of the
research relied upon at the time:
The data adduced by the petitioner ... are too tentative and
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty
tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt. We simply
cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a
matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital
punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or
substantially increases the risk of conviction. In light of the presently
available information, we are not prepared to announce a per se
constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction returned
by a jury selected as this one was.
Id. at 170-71 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968)).
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with determining the accused's guilt on the capital charge.286 It
rejected the argument that death qualification unfairly skewed the
jury in favor of conviction, holding:
Having identified some of the more serious problems with
McCree's studies, however, we will assume for purposes of this
opinion that the studies are both methodologically valid and
adequate to establish that "death qualification" in fact
produces juries somewhat more "conviction-prone" than "non-
death-qualified" juries. We hold, nonetheless, that the
Constitution does not prohibit the States from "death
qualifying" juries in capital cases.
287
Subsequent federal decisions have included references to more
scholarly studies supporting the argument that death qualification
skews capital juries toward conviction.
288
286. Id. at 171 ("It goes almost without saying that if these studies were "too
tentative and fragmentary" to make out a claim of constitutional error in 1968,
the same studies, unchanged but for having aged some 18 years, are still
insufficient to make out such a claim in this case.").
287. Id. at 173.
288. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 426 (1986), (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("As it did in [Lockhart], the Court today assumes that the
accumulated scholarly studies demonstrate that death qualification produces
juries abnormally prone to convict. This assumption is well-founded. The
evidence is overwhelming that death-qualified juries are 'substantially more
likely to convict or to convict on more serious charges than juries on which
unalterable opponents of capital punishment are permitted to serve."' (quoting
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 184 (Marshall, J., dissenting))); see also United States v.
Young, 376 F. Supp. 2d 787, 797 (M.D. Tenn. 2005), vacated, 424 F.3d 499 (6th
Cir. 2005) (providing the district court ordered the empanelling of separate
juries on the questions of guilt/innocence and punishment in a federal death-
penalty trial and the circuit court vacated the order on the government's
interlocutory appeal). The district court's order in Young granting the
severance of these issues included its reference to the increasing body of
research on the impact of death qualification on predisposition of jurors to
convict:
The Defendants (sic) cites several studies to support these
propositions. Acker, Bohm, & Lanier, AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2d ed. 2003); Bowers & Foglia, Still Singularly
Agonizing: Law's Failure to Purge Arbitrariness From Capital
Sentencing, 39 CRIM. LAW. BULLETIN 51 (2003); Bowers, Steiner &
Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis
of the Role of Jurors" Race and Jury Racial Composition, U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 171 (2001); Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of
Death Qualification on Jurors" Predisposition to Convict and on the
Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEH. 53 (1984); Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, Due Process v. Crime Control: Death Qualification and
Jury Attitudes and Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEH. 31 (1984); Craig
Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the
Process Effect, 8 LAw & HUM. BEH. 133 (1984); Craig Haney, On the
Selection of Capital Juriess: The Biasing Effects of the Death-
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Not only does the death-qualification process serve to enhance
the likelihood that the capital sentencing jury will return a verdict
imposing a death sentence in the capital sentencing process, but it
offers prosecutors a potentially attractive alternative in securing
murder convictions where the evidence of guilt may be marginal or
the strength of aggravating circumstances is in doubt. By charging
any murder potentially qualifying for punishment as a capital
offense, a prosecutor may threaten the accused with the death
penalty in order to induce a guilty plea that will result in imposition
of a life sentence. But if the case demands trial, the death-
qualification process provides additional assurance of conviction
when the evidence may be less than overwhelming. Once the death
qualified jury convicts on the capital charge-consistent with the
widely held perception that death qualification produces a jury more
prone to conviction-the prosecutor can elect not to pursue a death-
sentence, resulting in imposition of the alternative of a life sentence,
the only sentencing option for a capital conviction in many
jurisdictions. 28 9 The process of death qualification thus may not
only serve to reduce minority participation on capital juries, but also
serve to advance the interests of prosecutors in securing conviction
on capital charges.
When prosecutors use death qualification in selecting the
capital jury and then exercise discretion in declining to seek a death
sentence following conviction, defense counsel is left without
recourse.290 To object and subject the client to capital sentencing in
Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEH. 121 (1984); Haney,
Hurtado, & Vega, "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on Its
Biasing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEH. 619 (1994).
Young also references the work of the Capital Jury Project ("CJP"), a
program of research on the decision-making of capital jurors started
in 1991 by a grant from the National Science Foundation. See http:/!
www.cjp.neu.edu (last visited Apr. 6, 2005) (listing dozens of
publications based on CJP research). Several courts have cited CJP
research. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 305 (1999)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("common
experience, supported by at least one empirical study, see Bowers,
Sandys, & Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature
Decision Making, 83 Corn. L. Rev. 1476, 1486-1496 (1998), tells us
that the evidence and arguments presented during the guilt phase of a
capital trial will often have a significant effect on the jurors' choice of
sentence.")
Young, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 797 n.8.
289. E.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A)(1) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-
104(b) (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.4-102(1)(a) (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN.
921.141(1) (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(a) (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.31(a) (West 2011).
290. See, e.g., Hurd v. State, 735 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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such a circumstance could only have the negative consequence of
exposing the convicted defendant to a death sentence, or forcing
mistrial and a second trial in which the client would still face the
possibility of a death sentence. Like the tactic of charging murders
as capital offenses in order to induce guilty pleas when there is no
true intent to seek a death sentence, a tactic designed to impose life
sentences without trial, the threat of capital sentencing to obtain
the advantage of empanelling conviction-prone jurors in close cases
in terms of evidence, suggests impropriety. Yet it is impropriety
that likely requires the accused facing the possibility of death to
proceed in light of the superior litigation posture available to the
State. 29
1
Elimination of the prosecution's peremptory challenges is an
approach to the problem of disparity in minority representation on
capital juries that preserves reliance on the death penalty as a
sentencing option for states and the federal government. Of course,
the demographic difference in support and opposition to capital
sentencing suggests that capital juries will continue to reflect
disproportional underrepresentation of black jurors because of the
higher incidence of opposition to capital sentencing as long as
Witherspoon disqualification continues to shape the composition of
the capital jury.
CONCLUSION
Given the logic of the Court's approach in Witherspoon and its
implicit recognition that death qualification will necessarily result
in a jury that does not reflect the view of a substantial portion of the
community-the significant opposition in the black community to
capital punishment-not only does the death-qualification process
exclude the expressed moral judgment on capital punishment held
by this part of the community, but it serves to reduce the black
presence in a symbolically important process in the criminal justice
system.
The Court's decisions in Turner v. Murray and Rosales-Lopez v.
United States implicitly recognize that racially discriminatory
attitudes of jurors threaten to compromise the integrity of the fact-
finding process. In capital cases in which the death penalty is a
sentencing alternative, moreover, racial animus or bias may unfairly
infect the sentencing decision with a constitutionally prohibited
factor-perhaps the most important constitution prohibition at this
point in our history, in fact-resulting in imposition of death
sentences based on race or ethnicity, rather than on the nature of
291. See, e.g., id. (noting that the defendant pleaded guilty to avoid
possibility of the death penalty where counsel scared him by explaining the
possibility that an all-white jury might sentence him to death).
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the offense, proof of aggravating circumstances warranting
consideration of the death penalty, or the character of the
defendant. Instead, a death sentence may be the product of racially
biased judgments about the defendant's character that ignore the
existence of mitigating circumstances.
If death qualification can be accomplished only at the cost of
excluding African Americans or other minority citizens from this
most important aspect of the civic duty of jury service, then the cost
arguably outweighs any benefit of relying on capital punishment as
an expression of community conscience. That is, unless we are
prepared to abandon the goal of full equality within the community
in which all ethnic groups are entitled to representation and whose
views are respected by the entire community.
The death-qualification process represents the type of systemic
flaw-not as a result of intended design, but as a reality of
experience-that undermines the goal of a racially neutral and fair
administration of the death penalty. Ultimately, the demographic
consequence of death qualification is the legitimization of a process
in which the need for expression of community attitudes on the
suitability of capital punishment is compromised by limitations in
defining the community through the lens of race and ethnicity.
292 It
is a compromise that inherently undermines the credibility of
capital sentencing as a punishment option predicated on acceptable
penological goals.
Over the past several years, abolition of the death penalty has
become a viable option for dealing with many of the concerns over
the fairness and economic costs of its use. The problems in
administering capital sentencing, including its fiscal costs, have
prompted a number of states to abolish the death penalty despite its
continuing viability as a constitutionally acceptable punishment
option for the most heinous of offenses. 293 New Jersey,294 New
292. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 690 P.2d 669, 686 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled on other grounds, People v.
Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Cal. 1987). The former Chief Justice observed,
with respect to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges:
A sentencing jury in a capital case is supposed to "express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death."
A jury systematically culled of blacks and women simply cannot
"speak for the community" on the question as to whether death is
warranted. The underrepresentation of these important segments of
the community undermines the legitimacy and reliability of any death
verdict reached by such a jury.
Id. at 687 (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519, 520 (footnote omitted)).
293. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2009: YEAR END
REPORT (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents
/FactSheet.pdf.
294. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2007) (repealing a death-penalty
sentencing provision in a homicide statute). In State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133,
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Mexico,295 Illinois, 296  Connecticut, 297  and Maryland 298  have
legislatively rejected further reliance on capital sentences to address
murder, while significant legislative debate has failed to result in
repeal of capital sentencing in other states.299 The New York Court
of Appeals held that the state's death-penalty statute could not be
1139-41 (N.J. 2009), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a defendant,
convicted of capital murder, could be sentenced under the life-without-parole
mandatory sentence authorized under the amended statute, but only if the
State could prove that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
circumstances. Such a finding would have resulted in a death sentence under
the former provision, whereas under the amended statute the court is able to
impose the less onerous sentence of life imprisonment. See § 2C:11-3. If the
State failed to meet its burden however, the defendant would be subject to a life
sentence with a possible thirty-year parole disqualifier, which remains
available under the former statute. See id. In this way, the majority sought to
avoid the ex post facto claim resting on the imposition of a retroactive sentence
voided by intervening legislative action, an approach sharply criticized by
dissenting Justice Albin, joined by Justice Long. Fortin, 969 A.2d at 1141.
They maintained that the majority's decision violated the ex post facto
protections afforded by both the United States and the New Jersey
Constitutions. Id. at 1141-42 (Albin, J., dissenting).
295. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1 (LexisNexis 2009), repealed by 2009 N.M.
Laws ch. 11, §§ 5-7. The repeal of the State's capital sentencing statute applied
the change in the law prospectively, requiring the New Mexico Supreme Court
to consider what procedure would apply to capital prosecutions pending at the
time of the effective date of the amendment, for which death sentences could
still be imposed. See In re Death Penalty Sentencing Jury Rules, 222 P.3d 674
(N.M. 2009); In re Death Penalty Sentencing Jury Instructions, 222 P.3d 673
(N.M. 2009). In a pre-repeal case, State v. Fry, the court had rejected a
challenge to the State's capital sentence process on the ground that the jury
sentencing procedure did not require jurors to first find that proven aggravating
circumstances outweighed mitigating ones, before they could impose a sentence
of death. 126 P.3d 516, 531-32 (N.M. 2005). In the post-repeal decisions, the
court held that its revised rule for capital sentencing process permitted the
capital defendant to elect to have separate juries empanelled for the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial and the capital sentencing phase, in the event
of conviction, pursuant to Rule 5-704(A) NMRA. See, e.g., In re Jury Rules, 222
P.3d at 674-65 ("[T]his Court concludes that providing the option of having two
separate juries--one to determine innocence or guilt and one to determine
sentencing-for the limited number of death penalty cases that remain pending
in New Mexico may address some of the concerns expressed by the Governor the
Legislature, and others regarding the death penalty system in New Mexico.").
296. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119-1 (West 2012).
297. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54b (West 2012).
298. Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013 with the Governor
signing the law on May 2, 2013. Act of May 2, 2013, ch. 156, 2013 Md. Laws;
see also Joe Sutton, Maryland Governor Signs Death Penalty Repeal, CNN-US
(May 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/us/maryland-death-penalty
/index.html.
299. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The
American Law Institute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal
Code, 89 TEX. L. REV. 353, 362 n.70 (2010) (collecting news reports of repeal
failures in New Hampshire, Montana and Kansas within the past four years).
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constitutionally applied in decisions rendered in 2004300 and 2007,301
because the "deadlocked jury" instruction, deemed critical to the
operation of the sentencing process, was found to be constitutionally
flawed. 30 2 Meanwhile, the jurisdictions most actively relying on the
death penalty as a punishment option continue to impose capital
sentences while the actual rate of execution remains relatively
low. 30 3
Short of abolition, there is little way to assure minority
representation on capital juries that fairly reflects community
demographics. Even elimination of peremptory challenges, which
300. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 357 (N.Y. 2004).
301. People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984 (N.Y. 2007) (applying LaValle to
vacate death sentence imposed at trial).
302. In LaValle, the court held that the "deadlocked jury" instruction
included in the capital sentencing statute was fatally flawed. 817 N.E.2d at
356-66. The instruction required the jury to be instructed that in the event it
could not reach a sentencing decision unanimously, "the court will sentence the
defendant to a term of imprisonment with a minimum term of between twenty
and twenty-five years and a maximum term of life." Id. at 356 n.9 (quoting N.Y.
CRIM. PRO. LAW § 400.27 (2004)).
The court explained the flaw in this statutorily-mandated instruction:
Like some other states with death penalty statutes, New York
recognized that jurors should know the consequences of a deadlock.
However, New York's deadlock provision is unique in that the
sentence required after a deadlock is less severe than the sentences
the jury is allowed to consider. No other death penalty scheme in the
country requires judges to instruct jurors that if they cannot
unanimously agree between two choices, the judge will sentence
defendant to a third, more lenient, choice.
Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The instruction, as written and
required to be given, would at least theoretically influence a capital jury to
reach a sentencing verdict in order to avoid the possibility that the trial judge
would impose a more lenient sentence than the death or life-without-parole
options statutorily authorized, and available only, to juries upon conviction for
capital murder. Id. Later, in Taylor, the court rejected the argument that it
should simply "re-write the deadlock instruction," concluding that "the death
penalty sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and it is not within
our power to save the statute." 878 N.E.2d at 983-84. It held that LaValle
compelled that Taylor's death sentence be vacated, noting, "The Legislature,
mindful of our State's due process protections, may reenact a sentencing statute
that is free of coercion and cognizant of a jury's need to know the consequences
of its choice." Id. at 984. As of publication, it appears that the legislature has
yet to adopt an amendment to the capital sentencing process designed to
address the court's reasoning in these decisions.
303. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, as of January 1,
2014, 3070 inmates resided on death row in state and federal prisons; as of
September 5, 2014, 1386 executions have been performed since 1976 when the
Court upheld post-Furman capital sentencing statutes in Gregg, Proffitt, and
Jurek; and a total of 27 executions have been performed in 2014. DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1-3, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2014).
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would further the goal of ensuring that jurors are not excluded due
to race or ethnic bias protected by reference to hesitance about
imposition of a death sentence, would provide only a partial
measure of relief from the imbalance in capital jury composition that
undermines the integrity of capital sentencing.
